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Abstract 
 
The vehicle is a challenging environment in which to interact with computing 
devices. Therefore, the vehicle environment offers computing a unique challenge, in 
that a method for safe and secure mobile device integration is required in order to 
provide a suitable communications channel for interaction with devices without 
distracting from the primary driving task.  
 
Moreover, a security architecture is required for mobile device integration in the 
vehicle paradigm. This architecture must be scalable, efficient and most importantly 
built on trusted and mathematically sound algorithms.  
 
This thesis examines the relevant literature in the field of automotive telematics, 
including the notion of mobile device integration. Moreover, issues in the vehicle 
paradigm are also discussed which include driver distraction, and the legal 
ramifications of in-vehicle mobile phone use. From a system design view point this 
thesis will then provide an overview of the design requirements for telematics 
products, and outline possible security protocols which could be implemented on 
constrained mobile devices.  
 
The ultimate aim of this thesis is to develop a security architecture for mobile device 
integration for automotive telematics based on the simple network management 
protocol (SNMPv3) user security model.    
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1. Introduction 
Currently, mobile telecommunications technology is undergoing an evolutionary 
back flip. Modern mobile telecommunications devices are the direct descendents of 
the in-built car phones of the 1940s.  However the devices of today are heading back 
to the vehicle.  
 
From their humble beginnings as a the device of the businessman, modern mobile 
phones are now the ‘must have’ device for all. In fact, Fortunati (2001) shows that it 
was the extensive use of mobile phones in the workplace that ‘dragged’ the mobile 
phone into the domestic environment, and transformed the device into a ‘personal 
technology’ that can seamlessly follow the user from the workplace to the home.  
 
As the popularity of the mobile phone has increased, so has the notion of the ‘mobile 
worker’. The need to work from anywhere has taken the mobile phone out of the 
office and into other environments, including the vehicle. 
 
Recent research estimates that worldwide mobile phone adoption will reach two 
billion by 2007 (instat.com 2003). If this figure is coupled with other estimates that 
suggest that 85 percent of mobile phone owners use their mobile phone at least 
occasionally while driving (Goodman et al. 1997), by 2007 there could be 
approximately 1.7 billion drivers worldwide who are likely to use their mobile 
phone at some point while in control of a vehicle. Moreover, Hahn et al. (2000) 
estimate that mobile phone users spend 60 percent of their total mobile conversation 
time conversing while in control of a vehicle. 
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It is safe to predict that with the worldwide growth of demand for mobile services, 
and with the increasing notion of the ‘mobile worker’, mobile phone users will 
expect more from their device. Moreover, mobile phone users will look to their 
vehicles as not just a mode of transportation, but a mobile work environment. This 
will lead to increased use of mobile phones in vehicles. As such, in order for mobile 
devices to be successfully incorporated into vehicles they require a method for safe 
vehicle integration, which employs advanced human interaction techniques, an 
architecture for authentication, while requiring limited cognitive demand for 
operation. 
1.1. Thesis Aims 
The following are the goals which were examined in this thesis: 
1. Review the relevant literature in the field of automotive telematics, and 
mobile device integration. 
2. Explore the issues in developing systems for the vehicle environment. 
Including human computer interaction requirements, and the safety 
implications of in-vehicle mobile phone use. 
3. Review relevant literature relating to the background of security 
methodologies. 
4. Outline a security architecture for use on mobile devices of differing 
specifications. Where the underlying algorithms which comprise this 
architecture are both proven and mathematically sound. 
5. Extend this system into a protocol for use in a networked environment. 
6. Evaluate the Ang face recognition system for use as a possible user 
authentication method. 
3 
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2. Literature Review 
The following chapter will examine the existing literature relevant to in-car 
telematics products, their design and their focus on security. This chapter will also 
explore a range of issues including the legal implications of in-vehicle mobile phone 
use and the issue of driver distraction. Moreover, the principles of human-computer 
interaction will be introduced, as this forms the base design requirements for in-car 
mobile device integration and telematics products. Finally, traditional security 
mechanisms will be discussed, with particular focus on the rationale for, and 
suitability of, their application in the mobile environment, concentrating on 
methodologies for transparent and limited interaction user and device authentication.    
2.1. Background 
Automotive electronics have developed substantially since Paul Galvin the founder 
of Motorola developed the first car radio in the 1930s (Motorola 2005). Today, the 
scope of automotive electronics has evolved to include everything from 
entertainment systems, to monitored fleet services, and navigation systems. This 
new generation of advanced automotive electronics is known as telematics. The 
average modern vehicle contains approximately twenty computers. These systems 
are largely ubiquitous, and include functions ranging from the compact disk player 
in the center console, to the digital displays mounted in the dashboard, and the anti-
lock breaking system (ABS), traction control, and fuel injection systems in the 
motor and associated systems. 
2.1.1. Telematics 
The term ‘telematics’ was derived from a translation of the term ‘télématique’, 
which first appeared in a historically significant report entitled L'informatisation de 
2. Literature Review 
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la Société (Nora and  Minc 1968) (translated: The Computerisation of Society) 
presented to the President of France in 1968. In this report the term ‘telematics’ was 
used to define the merger of telecommunications and computer technology. This 
definition still holds true today. However, modern day telematics engineering is 
focused on merging personal telematics devices such as mobile phones, with other 
telematics genres in an attempt to integrate telematics into the vehicle and other 
contexts. 
2.1.2. Ubiquitous and Pervasive Computing 
The notion of ‘ubiquitous’ and ‘pervasive’ computing was first introduced by the 
visionary researcher Weiser (1999) who states “the most profound technologies are 
those that disappear. They weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life until 
they are indistinguishable from it.” This notion is realised by embedding computers 
throughout an environment. These invisible embedded devices are often connected 
in a redundant full mesh topology, where they communicate the status of the 
environment. This allows the overall system to appear ‘smart’ as the environment 
itself can sense and respond to changes. These systems are ubiquitous as they are 
unobtrusive to the user and therefore operate independently without user interaction. 
2.2. The Automotive Telematics Revolution 
A report by the principle analyst of the Telematics Research Group states that the 
automobile has undergone a vast transformation over the past two decades, shifting 
from an analogue machine consisting of predominantly mechanical control systems, 
to a digital car containing mostly computer-based control systems (Juliussen 2003). 
The notion of the ‘digital car’ is an automobile, which contains multiple dedicated 
and interconnected computing devices, which together create both a telematics and 
vehicle control system.  
 
Traditionally telematics systems consist of three basic capabilities (Juliussen 2003). 
These consist of one or more two-way communication pathways, which can include 
wireless networking mediums such as Bluetooth or 802.11 variants, for 
interconnection with other devices in the vehicle, to mobile voice/data based 
networks including GSM, CDMA and GPRS, EV-DO to provide internet 
connectivity, or a medium to enable real-time services.  
2. Literature Review 
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The second key capability of an automotive telematics system is a global positioning 
system that can be used to provide location based and fleet monitoring services. 
Finally, a computing platform is required for system control and an interface to 
automotive electronics systems, including system buses and input/output devices 
such as inbuilt vehicle displays.  
 
This is however a traditional overview of the requirements of a telematics system. 
As stated in Section 2.1.1 there has been a shift in the telematics industry to provide 
means for the integration of personal telematics devices in the vehicle. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Worldwide Telematics Forecast (Strategy Analytics)1 
 
Figure 2.1 above illustrates market research estimates of the prospected growth of 
the telematics industry market by 2007. These projected figures include both 
original-equipment-manufacture (OEM) and aftermarket units. It is also estimated 
that by 2007, approximately 55 percent of new vehicles sold worldwide will be 
telematics enabled, compared to just 7.5 percent in 2000 (Zhao 2002). 
                                                 
1
 Strategy Analytics - http://www.strategyanalytics.net/  
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2.2.1. What is the ‘killer application’? 
It is difficult to estimate that there will be a single application that will be the driving 
force of the telematics industry. The primary reason for this is that the requirements 
for user services differ in different regions of the world. 
Table 2.1. Telematics Market and Technology Trends by Region (2004)2 
Factors Telematics Trends Comments
USA  75 people/sq mile  Safety & Security TM  GM telematics bundling
 60 autos/sq mile  Mobile device TM growing  BMW & M-B strong
 53% mobile phone use  Navigation TM emerging  What will Ford do?
Japan  872 people/sq mile  Navigation TM dominant  Toyota G-Book as standard?
 501 auto/sq mile  VICS traffic information  Nissan Carwings as standard?
 65% mobile phone use  Rapid growth projected  Honda InterNavi
Germany  598 people/sq mile  Mobile device TM is leader  BMW & M-B home market
 343 autos/sq mile  Navigation TM important  Hands-free mobile phone law
 76% mobile phone use  TMC traffic information  Germany is European leader
Western
 175 people/sq mile  Mobile device TM is leader  Hands-free mobile phone law
Europe  74 autos/sq mile  Some navigation TM  OEM home markets:
 83% mobile phone use  Some safety/security TM   France, Italy, Sweden
Other  Australia & NZ  Holden & luxury autos  Australia: Holden home market
Regions  S. Korea  TM from all Korean OEMs  Korea: 3G mobile phone leader
 Other countries  Primarily in luxury autos  Mostly European luxury cars
 
Table 2.1 above shows how the focus of the telematics industry changes according 
to the region (Telematics Research Group 2004). America is primarily concerned 
with safety and security telematics, due to a relatively low mobile phone adoption 
rate and an average of only 60 vehicles per square mile. However mobile device 
integration is an area of growth in the region. Asia is focused on providing advanced 
navigation systems, as they have overpopulated motorways with an average of 501 
vehicles per square mile. Finally, countries in the European Union are more 
dedicated toward the development of services for mobile device integration in 
vehicles, due to the high adoption rate of mobile phones in the region and the 
introduction of laws, which regulate mobile phone use in vehicles.  
2.3. Legislation 
The use of mobile phones while driving has been shown to contribute to traffic 
accidents. Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997) found that the likelihood of a motor 
                                                 
2
 Telematics Research Group (Europe) - http://www.telematicsresearch.de/  
2. Literature Review 
7 
vehicle collision was increased four-fold when using a mobile phone while in 
control of a vehicle (Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2. Effect of Alcohol and Mobile Phone use on driving ability 
 
The above Figure is put in perspective when compared with a two-fold risk increase 
in the likelihood of an accident while driving a vehicle with a blood alcohol level of 
0.06 percent, which is 0.01 percent higher than the Australia legal limit (Brick 
1996). Moreover, a recent study concluded that the risk of a fatal vehicle accident 
increases nine-fold with the use of a mobile phone (Violanti 1999). It is due to 
findings such as these that an increasing number of countries and jurisdictions 
around the world are enacting legislation to limit the use of mobile phones while in 
control of a motor vehicle.  
2.3.1. Australian Legislation 
Australian legislation relating to in-vehicle mobile phone use is incorporated into the 
state and territory traffic regulations. In Tasmania as in other jurisdictions of 
Australia the use of hand-held mobile phones is banned while the vehicle is moving 
or stationary but not parked (State Government of Tasmania 1999). It should be 
noted that under this legislation hand-held two-way radios do not fall under the 
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definition of ‘hand-held mobile phone’. Moreover, this legislation does allow the 
use of mobile phones used in a hands-free capacity.  
2.3.2. American Legislation 
Legislation in countries such as the United States of America is dramatically less 
stringent than that of Australia and other regions. In the USA mobile phone use in 
vehicles is also legislated at the state level of government (National Conference of 
State Legislatures 2003). Other than New York, Massachusetts has the most 
stringent legislation where mobile phone use is permitted as long as it does not 
interfere with the operation of the vehicle and one hand remains on the steering 
wheel at all times. Legislation in the states of Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Nevada, Oklahoma and Oregon prohibit local jurisdictions from restricting the use 
of mobile phones while driving. Finally in the states Maine and New Jersey drivers 
below the age of 21 are prohibited from using a mobile phone while driving, where 
drivers above the age of 21 are unrestricted. 
2.3.3. Penalties 
Another aspect of the current legislation, although primarily in America, is that the 
penalties for non-conformation are not sufficient to deter offenders. Brooklyn, Ohio 
was the first American jurisdiction to enact legislation that bans in-car mobile phone 
use. However, the penalty for non-conformation is only US$3 (Hahn, Tetlock and  
Burnett 2000). This can be compared to Australian law where the highest penalty 
occurs in the state of New South Wales where the fine for non conformation is 
AU$226 and 3 demerit points (Queensland Business Review 2003). 
Adequate Legislation? 
It is interesting to note that the only country that has proof of the effectiveness of 
their adopted legislation is also the country that enforces the harshest penalty.  
 
Since November 1 1999 the use of a portable hand-held telephone device while in 
control of a vehicle was prohibited in Japan, unless the vehicle is stationary, or it is 
an emergency. The penalty for non-conformation is up to three months in prison or 
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fines of up to 50,000 Yen (AUD$4773). Moreover, just 12 months after the 
legislation was enacted there was a 52.3 percent decline in traffic accidents where 
the driver was using a mobile phone, a 53.3 percent drop in the number of injuries 
from accidents where the driver was using a mobile phone, and a 20 percent 
decrease in the number of fatalities from traffic accidents where a mobile phone was 
used by the driver (Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA) 2001). 
 
Williams (2002) states that the current enacted legislation does not directly address 
the problem of mobile phone use while in control of a motor vehicle, and therefore 
these laws are likely to have only a limited effect. It can be concluded that the 
current legislation does not successfully address the problem because the 
punishment occurs after the fact, if at all. Therefore, drivers are not likely to adhere 
to the restrictions.  
2.4. Cognitive Distraction 
It is interesting to note that the legislation which bans the use of hand-held mobile 
phones while driving allows the use of these devices in a hands free capacity. The 
aforementioned legislation makes the assumption that any interference from mobile 
phone use while in control of a motor vehicle is related to peripheral factors, which 
include dialling and holding the phone while conversing. Redelmeier and Tibshirani 
(1997) have shown that mobile devices which offer hands-free operation offer no 
safety advantages compared to hand-held devices.  
 
Many studies attribute the increased risk of vehicle accidents to a lack of attention 
on the primary driving task while conversing on the mobile phone. Strayer and 
Johnston (2001) conducted studies on the effect of single operation tasks such as 
attending to auditory input in the form of listening to the car radio or a recorded 
audio book, and concluded that single operation tasks are not sufficient to produce 
an impairment in driving performance.  
                                                 
3
 Exchange rate calculated at http://www.x-rates.com/calculator.html (accessed 20 Oct 2005) 
2. Literature Review 
10 
2.4.1. Inattention Blindness 
Strayer and Johnston et al. (2003) extended this research with a number of 
experiments to study the level of attention loss in intensive dual-task procedures. 
The results of one experiment found that participants suffered from ‘inattention 
blindness’, in that their recognition memory of billboards in a simulated driving 
environment was impaired while conversing on a mobile phone.  
 
Strayer and Johnston et al. further extended this experiment by tracking the user’s 
eye movement while driving in the simulated driving environment. Their results 
indicated that even though these participants were directly focused their vision on 
billboards during a simulated driving task the increased cognitive load of the mobile 
phone conversation impaired their recognition memory for this information. These 
results complement those of Sodhi et al. (2002), and Trbovich and Harbluk (2003), 
who also monitored driver eye movements under conditions of varying cognative 
demand. Sodhi et al., and Trbovich and Harbluk all monitored driver eye movement 
when presented with tasks of differing cognitive load.  
 
Sodhi found that during the use of a mobile phone while driving in a real-world 
environment, the driver’s eyes would wander around the centre of the windscreen 
and glances to the odometer and mirrors were less frequent in comparison to normal 
driving conditions. Trbovich and Harbluk tested the cognitive distraction of mobile 
phone use on traffic light awareness, with their results suggesting that while 
conversing on the phone the number of glances to traffic lights greatly decreased 
and were in some instances non-existent.  
2.4.2. Increased Reaction Times 
Alm and Nilsson (1995) conducted a simulated driving study consisting of 40 
subjects in order to test the effects of mobile phone use on vehicle following 
distances. It was concluded that the use of a mobile phone in the simulated 
environment corresponded to a decrease in reaction time. Moreover, it was found 
that this impairment was more apparent in older drivers. Alm and Nilsson 
discovered that the subjects did not compensate for their slowed reaction times by 
2. Literature Review 
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increasing the following distance to the vehicle ahead. It was concluded that this was 
due to the fact that the subjects were unaware of the impairment. 
2.4.3. Benefits of Mobile Phone Use While Driving? 
The aformentioned research has focused on the effects using a mobile phone has on 
the participants driving ability. However a report by Parkes (1991) used simulated 
driving environments coupled with in-vehicle driving on urban and rural roads, in 
order to discover if the task of driving can affect the drivers understanding and 
interpretation of the mobile phone conversation. It was concluded that participants 
had significantly greater difficulty in remembering and correctly interpreting 
information from the conversation while driving, compared to when not driving, or 
conversing with a passenger. 
2.5. Human Computer Interaction in Telematics 
It has been shown that the effect of mobile phone use on driving ability is a relevant 
concern worldwide. However, this issue is not restricted to interaction with a mobile 
phone. More accurately, use of any telematic devices while driving induces 
cognitive demands on the driver. Mobile phone use in vehicles has received such 
publicity as it is the most common case of mobile and telematics device use in 
vehicles worldwide. Because of this, safety and human computer interaction are 
fields of major research in the telematics industry. 
2.5.1. Base Design Requirements for Telematics Products 
Wheatley (2000) has outlined a number of basic design considerations for the 
development of telematics products, which include; 
 
• Interaction with the system as a secondary task; 
• This secondary task should not distract from the primary task of driving 
by increasing cognitive load on the driver; 
• The location of input/output devices must complement the limited space 
of the driving environment; 
• Input/output modalities suit the variable noise environment of the 
vehicle; 
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Wheatley (2000) has also outlined a number of human computer interaction design 
principles, which should be followed in order to develop high-level telematics 
products, these being:  
 
• Intuitiveness: Consumers expect the device to be easy and simple to use 
with little to no prior training. 
• Consistency: The basis of telematics products should be consistent across 
different manufactures. Consistency can be helped with the enforcement 
of industry standards and the implementation of customisable user 
preferences. 
• Interaction Modality: The input and output modalities of the device must 
suit the environment, and should take into consideration both the 
useability requirements of the system in the restricted environment of the 
vehicle, and environmental changes such as variable noise pollution 
levels. 
2.6. Advanced Human Computer Interaction 
The human computer interaction requirements outlined by Wheatley (2000) are an 
integral part of the base design requirements for telematics applications. However 
with the introduction of advanced user-centric telematics systems in vehicles which 
can include internet browsing, email and in-vehicle cinema systems, the driver are 
more likely than ever to be bombarded with information which primarily distracts 
form the primary task of driving. 
2.6.1. Workload Managers 
In attempt to combat such distraction Green (2004) has proposed the use of a driving 
workload manager. A driving workload manager is primarily a context awareness 
system for the vehicle paradigm. The basic requirement of a driving workload 
manger is a system that regulates the flow of information to a driver based on the 
current driving conditions. Workload managers have already been commercially 
implemented within the automotive industry. The 2003 Saab model 9-3 and 9-5 
vehicles contain a ‘dialog manager’ which monitors vehicle speed and windscreen 
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wiper movement among other things in an attempt to determine when it is safe to 
present vehicle service reminders to the driver.  
 
Green (2004) states that the enhancement of warning system effectiveness could be 
an even greater safety benefit than the control of telematics. This enhancement 
requires minimising information redundancies such as alerting a driver that they 
have strayed out of a lane, as in most situations the driver will be aware of their 
offence and the warning will only increase driver distraction. To combat this, the 
workload manager should attempt to sense driver inattention to the road and only 
present warnings in situations where the driver is truly unaware.  
2.6.2. Peripheral Displays 
In an attempt to provide information while not distracting from the primary task has 
lead to significant research in the field of the peripheral displays.  
 
Peripheral displays are output devices which abstract and present information in a 
manner which does not interfere with the primary task. Matthews et al. (2004) 
present a toolkit for managing user attention in peripheral displays. The key features 
of peripheral displays are data abstraction and notification level, which is associated 
with the level of available user attention. Data abstraction transforms input data into 
a form that is ‘semantically compatible’ with the questions the user is expected to 
ask of the data (for example). Next, a notification level is selected to alert the user to 
a change in information. This notification level is associated with the user’s 
currently available attention level. Matthews et al. (2004) conclude that the key for 
peripheral displays is the way they impact on user attention, which is especially 
important during mission-critical tasks such as driving a motor vehicle. 
2.6.3. Signalling Remote Callers 
Strayer and Johnston et al. (2003) found that conversing with a passenger did not 
increase the cognitive load on a driver to the point associated with inattention 
blindness, and therefore driving performance was unaffected by conversing with a 
passenger. It was concluded that in this instance both driver and passenger were 
aware of the current driving condition and can modulate their conversation 
accordingly.  
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Manalavan et al. (2002) extended this idea by creating a platform to signal the 
remote caller during times of increased driving load. This system consisted of a 
context-aware mobile phone which signalled the remote caller in times of increased 
load. It was concluded that the singling of remote callers in times of increased 
driving load induces the caller to talk less, which in turn lessens the cognitive load 
on the driver. It was found that when a caller’s conversation was reduced there was a 
marked increase in the driver’s performance of the primary task. In simulated 
driving environments the driver’s performance improved to the same level as 
driving with no phone call. 
2.6.4. ‘Sensitive’ Devices 
Hinckley and Horvitz (2001) developed an advanced human computer interaction 
paradigm by incorporating enhanced notification modalities into mobile devices in 
order to develop a ‘sensitive’ mobile device. This study presents a mobile device 
that is capable of interpreting input from the user by employing sensors that detect 
when the device is being held by the user, and can detect the location of the device 
in relation to nearby objects. Hinckley and Horvitz (2001) used these sensors to 
convey a sense of device sensitivity to the user. For example, when the device would 
ring to alert the user to an incoming call the sensors would detect when the user 
touches the device and automatically lower the ring volume. 
2.6.5. Gesture In-Vehicle Interface 
Alpern and Minardo (2003) explored the use of a gesture interface for in-car control 
of a secondary task. Their developed system projected an image on to a simulated 
heads-up-display, which users made gestures with their hand to navigate the 
interface. It was concluded that for an in-car gesture interface to minimise the effect 
of distraction of the primary driving task, quick glances of the user’s attention must 
be accommodated. The key design issues were the visibility of options and the ease 
of navigation. 
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2.7. In-Vehicle Technologies 
Although there is not a clear consensus on which device(s) will emerge as the 
telematics market leader(s), there has been extensive research to predict, which 
technologies consumers will wish to have in their vehicle (Figure 2.3). 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Technology Comparison - Global Sales Scenario4 
 
Figure 2.3 above shows a market research projection, which estimates that by the 
year 2010, in-vehicle phone options will be the leading technology in the automotive 
telematics industry. It is likely that these devices will be coupled with voice 
recognition and GPS receivers in order to provide a high level interaction modality, 
and location-based services to the vehicle. 
2.8. Mobile Device Integration 
Green’s (2004) notion of a driving workload manager requires a situation where all 
devices in a vehicle are interconnected in order for the information and services they 
provide to be restricted according to the current driving conditions. Moreover, with a 
                                                 
4
 Auto Industry - http://www.autoindustry.co.uk/  
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strong legal focus worldwide on restricting hand-held mobile phone use while in 
control of a vehicle, a method for mobile device integration is a key requirement for 
modern automotive telematics. 
2.8.1. What is holding the telematics industry back? 
The telematics industry is the amalgamation of multiple industries, all of which are 
looking to gain from the services they provide. As such, the business case for the 
deployment of telematics systems is as complex as the systems themselves. The 
major frontier for the telematics industry is to provide services for converged 
devices, which can be upgraded and customised as required. This said it is difficult 
for the automotive industry to corner the market for converged devices. This is 
primarily due to the development lifecycle of the automotive industry, which is 
typically 4 to 6 years, where products are developed for 10+ years of use. This is 
contrasted by the consumer electronics industry where products are designed in 6 to 
12 months and are in use for a period of 2 to 3 years (Fuchs and  Spaur 2004).  
2.8.2. Plug and Play Personal Telematics 
Fuchs and Spaur (2004) have proposed a solution to this problem, where automotive 
manufactures provide services for plug and play personal telematics devices to be 
integrated into the vehicle. This is achieved by automotive manufactures providing 
an in-vehicle Telematics Control Unit (TCU: Figure 2.4). The TCU provides access 
to vehicle resources, including vehicle electronics buses, and access to human 
machine interfaces, such as in-vehicle displays, audio controls and buttons. 
Consumer level personal telematics devices then connect to the telematics control 
unit and can be upgraded as required.  
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Figure 2.4. Plug and Play Telematics (Fuchs and  Spaur 2004) 
 
Figure 2.4 outlines the design of a plug and play telematics control unit and shows 
how devices are connected to it. Personal telematics devices such as mobile phones 
and PDAs are connected to the portable port. Shared devices are connected to the 
accessory interface port, and the vehicle electronics connect to the TCU via the 
vehicle interface port. 
 
Security is also a major concern in plug and play telematics. In this case the TCU 
serves as a secure gateway between mission-critical functions on the vehicle 
interface port and the secondary functions of the consumer devices connected via the 
portable, and accessory interface port.  
 
This plug and play TCU is integrated with wireless communications mediums 
including Bluetooth, WiFi and ultra wide band (UWB), this allows a wide range of 
devices to be connected to it, without having to provide specialised interfaces for 
connection of proprietary devices. 
 
There are however, a number of issues in allowing personal plug and play telematics 
devices to connect to the vehicle. A major requirement for a platform such as this is 
a common software framework between the personal telematics device and the 
TCU. 
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Open Operating Environment 
It is unreasonable to expect all in-vehicle devices and personal telematics devices 
will have the same software operating environment. As such, a successful plug and 
play personal telematics system connectivity framework must allow for connection 
from a wide variety of standardised open environments such as the Open Services 
Gateway Initiative (OSGi), and the Automotive Multimedia Interface Collaboration 
(AMI-C). 
Microsoft T-Box 
This said the open source versus proprietary closed system debate has found its way 
to the telematics platform. Microsoft has developed the T-Box, a plug and play 
telematics platform developed for the Microsoft Windows Automotive operating 
system. The T-Box is designed to communicate with personal telematics devices 
running the Windows Mobile for Automotive operating system. Windows Mobile 
for Automotive is a low end standard system that provides a gateway for 
entertainment, mobile phone and other devices brought into the vehicle to connect to 
the T-Box, while also offering a standardised platform for OEMs to build features 
that are specific to assessing the vehicle bus. The T-Box allows voice control of a 
mobile phone, or other personal telematics device running Windows Mobile for 
Automotive (Microsoft 2005). 
2.9. Advanced Telematics Systems 
As research has increased in the area of telematics and mobile device integration 
there have been multiple implementations (some commercial, some research based) 
which employ advanced human computer interaction techniques and input/output 
modalities to attempt to provide a suitable interaction medium for drivers while not 
interfering with the primary task of driving.  
2.9.1. SmartKom 
Human-computer interaction in a restricted environment such as the vehicle is a 
difficult issue to overcome. The German based SmartKom project provides a system 
that utilizes advanced multimodal human computer interaction (Malaka, Haeussler 
and  Aras 2004), (Reithinger et al. 2003), (Jöst et al. 2005). The SmartKom system 
realises full symmetric multimodal interaction, in that all input mediums can also be 
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used for output. The system is designed to be device independent by allowing users 
to connect their devices to the system to create a ‘personal IT infrastructure’. The 
system designers were aware that for a system to be ‘intelligent’ it must be able to 
interpret the context of the user’s current situation. Because of this the SmartKom 
system is segmented into three ‘environments’ home: public: and mobile, with the 
mobile environment incorporating sub-environments of car and pedestrian. The 
purpose of these ‘environments’ is to provide the most appropriate input/output 
modalities for the current user context. For example in the car environment the 
dominant modality is speech, so as to limit the level of physical interaction of the 
driver.  
 
This said the SmartKom system also allows for flexible device management, this 
permits the user to choose the device with which they interact. For example in the 
car environment the user may select either the screen of the navigation system for 
visual system output, or another device such as a personal digital assistant (PDA).  
2.9.2. Linguatronic 
As seen in Figure 2.2 mobile device integration is the leading telematics technology 
in Europe. The Linguatronic system was designed so drivers could interact conduct 
complex interactions with in-vehicle systems and mobile devices.  
 
The Linguatronic system is a voice operated Command & Control system that was 
first deployed in 1996 in the S-Class series of Mercedes-Benz cars in Germany 
(Bühler et al. 2003), (Heisterkamp 2000). The Linguatronic system allows for 
complete hands-free operation of the vehicle’s mobile phone, including number 
dialling, number storage, user defined telephone directory, name dialling and 
directory editing. The Linguatronic I Command & Control system contained a 
vocabulary of 30 speaker independent words, which included digits and control 
words. The second generation of the Linguatronic extended the vocabulary to 
approximately 300 words, which enables the voice control of the vehicles electronic 
devices such as the radio and air-conditioning. This is made possible by connecting 
the system to the vehicles optical fibre data bus. This data bus is the central 
information channel that connects all devices in the vehicle. As the speech modality 
can be used to control the vehicles electronic devices, the Linguatronic system 
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increases the useability of the vehicle computer interface. The Linguatronic system 
features a push-to-activate (PTA) button that signals that a command is to be 
entered.  
SpeechDat-Car 
One issue with voice based in-vehicle systems for mobile device integration, 
particularly in Europe, is the need for the system to support multiple languages for 
input and output. SpeechDat-Car is a project focused on the development of a set of 
speech databases to support the training and testing of multimodal speech 
recognition applications in the vehicle environment (Heuvel et al. 1999). The 
SpeechDat-Car project commenced in 1999 and has lead to the development of 
speech databases in nine languages, developed by recording speakers in different 
typical vehicle noise situations. It is the development of projects such as this which 
lead to the increased development of speech based in-car systems.  
In Silico Vox 
The ‘In Silico Vox’ project is a joint venture between the Carnegie Mellon 
University and the University of Berkeley. The purpose of this project is to 
implement a speech recognition hardware device. The development of speech 
recognition in hardware requires less computational processing and is therefore 
much more efficient than their software-based counterparts (economist.com 2005). 
Additionally, with the adoption of speech recognition hardware chips, advanced 
speech modalities can be incorporated into devices with less computational ability 
such as mobile phones. This could lead to a new revolution of voice-based human-
computer interaction. 
2.10. In-Vehicle Networking 
The plug and play telematics control unit defined by Fuchs and Spaur (2004) in 
section 2.8.2 enabled consumer mobile devices to be connected to the vehicle using 
a wide range of media. Theses included both wireless mediums such as Bluetooth, 
WiFi and Ultra wideband and wired mediums including USB, serial and IEEE 1394 
(FireWire). The telematics control unit described by Fuchs and Spaur (2004) 
envisioned that wired mediums would be used to connect devices with different 
physical interfaces. A similar issue is relevant for connection of wireless devices to 
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the control unit. However, why do we need multiple wireless mediums in the 
vehicle? The simple answer is that these technologies provide different services. 
2.10.1. Bluetooth  
Figure 2.3 shows that the availability of Bluetooth in the vehicle environment is 
anticipated to grow steadily until the year 2010. Simply stated Bluetooth is a short-
range communications protocol the purpose of which is to act as a cable replacement 
technology by connecting low powered devices without the need for proprietary 
cables. The Bluetooth standard outlines a signal range of up to 100 meters, which 
depends on the category of device (Hopkins and  Antony 2003), with low powered 
devices such as PDAs and mobile phones, for example, usually operate at a range up 
to 10 meters. Bluetooth operates in the 2.4 GHz ISM frequency band. and transmits 
at a raw data rate of 1 MBps. Transmission at this relatively low speed, at a distance 
of up to 10 meters means that Bluetooth has a low power requirement, which is 
suited as a communications medium between battery powered mobile devices. 
2.10.2. WiFi 
WiFi is the collective umbrella under which 3 major wireless local area networking 
(WLAN) technologies fall. These are IEEE 802.11a, 802.11b and 802.11g. These 
technologies can transmit at data rates from 11 MBps (802.11b) to 54 MBps 
(802.11a) (WiFi Alliance). These technologies are designed to connect relatively 
high powered devices, and therefore have a higher power requirement than that of 
Bluetooth. 802.11b operates in the 5 GHz ISM band. However 802.11a operates in 
the 2.4 GHz and therefore has the potential to interfere with Bluetooth.   
2.10.3. Bluetooth and WiFi 
Chiasserini and Rao (2000) explored coexistence mechanisms as a solution to the 
interference in concurrently running both IEEE 802.11b and Bluetooth in the 2.4 
GHz ISM frequency band. They explored both collaborative and non-collaborative 
methods. Collaborative methods require both Bluetooth and 802.11b transmitters 
reside in the same terminal. Collaborative methods use scheduling methodologies to 
restrict the transmission of either technology. This can be achieved by using a 
method such as Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), where both technologies 
are scheduled to transmit at different time intervals and therefore never overlap.  
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However, non-collaborative methods contain no way of communicating this 
scheduling information between systems running different technologies. Therefore 
the coexistence mechanism must be able to operate independently. An example of a 
non-collaborative coexistence mechanism is the Adaptive Frequency Hopping 
technique. In this method the frequency channels are partitioned and classified as 
either ‘good’ or ‘bad’. If the device selects a channel which is ‘bad’ it is replaced 
with a ‘good’ channel from the pool. 
 
The aforementioned research has outlined the current state of the automotive 
telematics industry. However, in order to provide security services in the telematics 
environment an introduction into the field of security is required. 
2.11. Authentication 
The act of authentication in the vehicle environment may be the defining factor in 
the acceptance of telematics devices. If users can authenticate themselves 
transparently, or with minimal physical interaction with the system they are more 
likely to use the system, which in the vehicle paradigm is designed to provide safer 
interaction with the device. Moreover, when a telematics system can successfully 
authenticate users, it can then offer a greater range of user specific services from 
user define preferences to user sensitive data such as email.   
2.11.1. Traditional Authentication 
Schneier (2004) describes three ways to authenticate a user. By something the user 
knows, for example a password. By something the person has in their possession, for 
example an authentication token, an identification card, or even the SIM card in a 
mobile phone. Finally you can authenticate a user by using something specific about 
the person themselves.  
 
Authenticating a user by using something a person knows is the most widely known 
method of user authentication to an operating system. This method binds a unique 
username representing a user’s identity, with a password, which acts as a shared 
secret between the user and the system. However, in a networked world users cannot 
afford to transmit this shared secret across an unsecured network. As such, the 
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requirement for systems to employ methods to hide these shared secrets has arisen. 
Additionally the operating system itself requires a list of the passwords for all users 
that are authorised to access the system. This list could also be vulnerable to attack. 
Because of this, each host in the network required a facility to mask a user’s 
password, which could then be compared to a directory of passwords for all users 
masked in the same way.  
2.12. Cryptography 
Cryptography is the process of transforming a user’s password into a form where it 
is unrecognisable as its original form. Menezes et al. (1997) define the field of 
cryptography as “the study of mathematical techniques related to aspects of 
information security such as confidentiality, data integrity, entity authentication, 
and data origin authentication.” Cryptography is traditionally a mathematical field, 
where cryptographers use well-proven mathematical functions to develop methods 
to convert plaintext information into ciphertext where this ciphertext cannot be 
reengineered to the original plaintext without secret knowledge, where this ‘secret 
knowledge’ is known as a key. In a modern world the field of cryptography 
encompasses a broad range of disciplines ranging from mathematics, to computer 
security and even civil and criminal law among others.   
2.12.1. Goals of Cryptography 
Menezes et al. (1997) nominate four objectives which form a framework for 
information security. These include privacy or confidentiality, data integrity, 
authentication and non-repudiation. 
Confidentiality  
The objective of confidentiality enforces a requirement where the content of 
information must be kept from all those except those authorised to have it. From a 
cryptographic perspective there are many approaches to facilitate the conservation of 
confidentiality from physical protection to mathematical algorithms which transform 
data so it is unintelligible. 
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Data Integrity 
The objective of the data integrity requirement is to guarantee that data has not been 
modified by an unauthorised entity. To ensure data integrity the ability to detect any 
modification to data by unauthorised parties is required. Data integrity must be able 
to check for unauthorised insertion, deletion and substitution of data.  
Authentication 
The objective of authentication is to prove the identity of the sender of the 
information and the information itself. Information which is transmitted over a 
channel should be authenticated as to its origin and include other unique identifiers 
including date and time stamps, random numbers, or the like. From a cryptographic 
perspective authentication is concerned with both entity authentication (proving the 
identity of the sender or originator of the information) and data origin authentication 
(which provides data integrity). 
Non-Repudiation 
The objective of non-repudiation is to prevent an entity from denying previous 
authorised communication. In this instance the services of an independent trusted 
third-party are often employed to resolve disputes. 
 
As mentioned above the field of cryptography contains of many different algorithms 
and techniques all of which are designed with differing goals in mind and are 
therefore used in different situations.  
2.12.2. Encryption 
Schneier (2003) states that encryption was the original goal of cryptography. 
Encryption allows a message to be sent between two entities on an unsecured 
channel who share a secret. The requirement of the shared secret means the contents 
of the message is secured from a third-party who eavesdrops on the channel, who 
does not share the secret. This process involves converting a plaintext message (m) 
by use of an encryption function described as c := E(Ke, m) which produces a 
ciphertext (c) result. Both entities share the secret Ke. Therefore when one trusted 
party encrypts a message and creates ciphertext (c) then the other entity can perform 
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use the decryption function described by m := D(Ke, c) to return the original 
plaintext message m (Schneier and  Ferguson 2003).         
 
The method for encryption described above is an integral step to prove the identity 
of an entity. This is why encryption methods are strongly associated with 
authentication.  
2.12.3. Message Authentication Codes 
However, the problem of authentication is only partly solved by encryption, in that 
anyone listening on the channel could still intercept the message sent between the 
two authorised entities and modify this message in some way.  
 
To resolve this limitation, Message Authentication Codes (MACs) come to the fore. 
A MAC is a function similar in design to the encryption function described in 
section 2.12.2. However, a MAC function is different to an encryption function in 
that it is designed to protect the integrity of the message. In this instance, if two 
entities wish to transmit a message securely across an unsecured channel the sender 
passes a plaintext message (m) through a MAC function (a) as described in a := 
h(Ka, m), where h is the MAC function and Ka is the shared secret between the two 
entities (Schneier and  Ferguson 2003). In this case the sender transmits both the 
plaintext message (m) and the MAC output (a) to the receiving entity. The message 
recipient then recomputes the MAC (a) and if the two versions of the MAC (a) are 
identical then the message has not been modified during transmission. Moreover, if 
an entity eavesdropping on the channel was to intercept the message and replace, or 
modify the message (m) in any way, the value the receiving entity computes for the 
MAC function (a) will be different to the one in the message received. Therefore , if 
the two MACs (a) are identical, the message receiver can be assured that the 
message has arrived in the form in which it was sent. 
 
Data which is protected by the use encryption and message authentication codes can 
still be susceptible to attack, as in this case there is nothing stopping an unauthorised 
party from either deleting or replaying a legitimate message. There are a number of 
methodologies to protect against these types of message stream modification attacks. 
These include the use of a sequence number or a timestamp. In this case each 
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message can contain a sequence number or a timestamp. When the receiving entity 
accepts a message the sequence number or timestamp is checked either, with the 
requirement either, that it is strictly greater than that of any message received so far, 
or with a timestamp the time or data origin can be determined for validation of the 
integrity of the information. Additionally a timeliness requirement can be added to 
messages, so that messages with a timestamp value outside of a predetermined range 
are automatically discarded. In both cases there are methods in place to limit 
susceptibility to message replay attacks. 
2.13. Key Distribution Problem     
Sections 2.12.2 and 2.12.3 have both made reference to a secret shared between the 
two conversing entities, in the form of a key. However, as yet there has been no 
method discussed for the creation or distribution of these keys.   
 
Schneier (2003) states the issue of managing and distributing keys is one of the 
major issues in the field of cryptography. In most cases, the physical distribution of 
keys is impractical as they are largely designed to be used by systems in a 
networked environment. Due to this, one to one physical contact between two 
entities wishing to share a key is usually impractical. 
2.13.1. Symmetric-Key Encryption 
Symmetric or secret key encryption it the simplest form of encryption. The shared 
key as used in sections 2.12.2 and 2.12.3 are both symmetric keys in that the same 
key is used for both encryption and decryption. Because of this the encryption and 
decryption algorithms used in symmetric key encryption are extremely close in 
design. Pfleeger (2003) states that as long as the key remains a secret, symmetric 
key systems can provide authentication, and ensure a base level of integrity as the 
original message will not decrypt properly if it has been modified in transmission. 
 
Symmetric key encryption is acceptable if there is a secure method to generate and 
distribute keys in such a way that only authorised users gain knowledge of this key. 
However, in a networked environment where secure communication is required 
between entities that are not necessarily known, how do entities establish a link 
between themselves where a symmetric key can be securely shared?  
2. Literature Review 
27 
2.13.2. Public-Key Encryption 
A solution to this problem is public or asymmetric key encryption. In this model 
each entity generates a pair of keys (S1, P1) using a defined algorithm, where the 
keys created consist of a secret key (S1) and a public key (P1) (Schneier and  
Ferguson 2003). The differing factor in public-key encryption as apposed to the 
symmetric-key encryption methodology described in section 2.13.1, is that in 
public-key encryption each entity publishes their public key.  Therefore, if an entity 
wishes to communicate with another entity in a secure fashion, they must first look 
up the other entities public key (P1) and use this key to encrypt a plaintext message 
(m) which creates a ciphertext (c), which is then sent to the owner of public key (P1). 
This entity can now use their secret key (S1) to decrypt the ciphertext (c) which will 
return the plaintext message (m) if the message has not been tampered with in 
transmission. Therefore the algorithms for key generation, encryption and 
decryption must ensure that decryption returns the original plaintext. Therefore 
Schneier (2003) defines public-key encryption as D (S1 , E (P1,m)) = m, for all m.  
2.13.3. Digital Signatures 
Schneier (2003) states that digital signatures “are the public-key equivalent of 
message authentication codes (MACs).” This is because like MACs, digital 
signatures are concerned with ensuring message integrity. In this instance entities 
are still required to have generated a pair of keys consisting of a public key (P1) and 
a secret key (S1), where the public key for each entity must be publicly available. In 
the case of digital signatures, when an entity wishes to bind their identity to a 
message they sign a plaintext message (m) with their secret key (S1) as defined in 
s:=(S1,m). The next step is to send the signed message (s), and the original message 
(m) to the receiver, who can ascertain who the sender was by using a verification 
algorithm along with the senders public key as defined by  := (P1, m, s) in order to 
validate the signature. The process of signing a message and then verifying the 
origin of the message is handled in the same way as for message authentication 
codes (MACs). However, in this case a receiving entity can verify the origin of a 
message by using the sender’s public key, where the sender must use their secret key 
to sign the message. Therefore an entity can verify the identity of the sender by 
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using a piece of public knowledge (P1), to verify the signed message (s). Moreover, 
anyone else on the channel can do this not just the receiving entity. 
 
The goal of a digital signature is to bind identity to a message by signing it with a 
piece of secret knowledge (S1). As this knowledge is secret, then digital signatures 
can be used to enforce non-repudiation, where the entity who signed the message 
cannot deny signing the message as only they have access to their secret key (S1). 
2.13.4. Evaluation of Encryption Methodologies 
There are positives and negatives for both symmetric-key and public-key encryption 
schemes. On one hand key distribution in public-key encryption methods is 
considerably simpler than that of symmetric-key encryption. However, public-key 
encryption endures a greater computational load than that of symmetric-key 
encryption. Moreover, public-key encryption is drastically less efficient than 
symmetric-key encryption, due to the inefficiencies and the requirement for public-
key encryption schemes to utilise three distinct algorithms for key generation, 
encryption and decryption. 
2.13.5. Evaluation of Message Integrity Methodologies 
Much the same as there are positives and negatives for both, symmetric key and 
public key encryption methodologies, the same holds true for the methodologies that 
ensure message integrity. However, as stated in Section 2.13.4 the main issue with 
the encryption schemes is efficiency. In this case message authentication codes 
(MACs) which employ symmetric key techniques to hide the contents of a message 
are inherently more efficient than the public key techniques used in digital 
signatures. This is primarily due to the fact that digital signatures require the use of 
multiple algorithms for key generation, message signing and message verification.  
2.14. Cryptographic Functions and Algorithms 
Sections 2.12 and 2.13 provided an introduction to the field of cryptography and the 
goals and issues solved by differing cryptographic methodologies. The following 
section will provide an overview of the major cryptographic algorithms. 
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2.14.1. Block Ciphers 
Block ciphers are an integral building block of modern cryptography. Schneier 
(2003, p. 43) defines block ciphers simply as an encryption function for fix-sized 
blocks. Traditionally block cipher algorithms utilise symmetric key methodologies 
to encrypt a message of n length with a shared key to produce a ciphertext. 
Decryption is achieved in the opposite fashion, in that the ciphertext is decrypted 
with the same shared key as used for encryption. This function will produce the 
original plaintext message, as long as the ciphertext was not tampered with in 
transit. The most widely known block cipher algorithm is the Digital Encryption 
Standard (DES). However, recent advances in cryptography and computer 
processing speed have rendered DES largely useless due to its restricted key size 
and small block size of 64 bits. Because of this small block size and mediocre key 
length the security offered by DES is not sufficient for modern security applications.  
A possible solution to strengthening DES was to expand the operation of DES into a 
scheme known as 3DES which was simply 3 DES encryptions running in sequence. 
However, the enhanced length of 3DES does not heighten its strength to an 
acceptable level for modern security applications. 
 
The problem that was left unsolved by the attempted strengthening of DES was that 
the underlying algorithm was left largely unchanged. Therefore, if a weakness was 
discovered in the underlying algorithm, any subsequent methods built on this 
algorithm were likely to be exploited in the same way. 
 
A solution to this was to reengineer the underlying block cipher algorithm. This was 
the achievement of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). This method uses a 
different approach than DES, where each step of the algorithm includes a number of 
operations which can be performed in parallel, which greatly enhances the speed of 
the algorithm 
2.14.2. Hash Functions 
Schneier (2003, p. 83) states that hash function are among the most versatile of the 
cryptographic primitives. This is due to the ability of hash functions to be used for 
encryption, authentication and for message integrity. 
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Hash functions differ to block ciphers in that they produce a fixed-size h(m) output 
from an arbitrarily long input (m). This fixed-sized output, coupled with efficient 
one-way operation makes hash functions the most versatile of the cryptographic 
primitives. The basic requirement for a successful hash function is that the function 
must be one-way, in that the original plaintext (m) can not be found given the hash 
output h(m). Another requirement for a successful hash function is the level of 
collision resistance, in that the hashed output h(m) must be unique for every 
different value of (m). However this requirement has can never hold true as hash 
functions return a fixed length output there are an inevitable number of collision as 
an infinite number of possible inputs (m) are constrained to return a finite number of 
outputs h(m).  
 
The two most popular hash functions are the message-digest algorithm MD5 and the 
secure hash algorithm SHA-1. MD5 is a hash function which returns a hash of 128 
bits or 16 bytes, where SHA-1 returns a hash of 160 bits or 20 bytes. In each case 
the plaintext message is segmented into fixed size blocks for processing.  
2.14.3. Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) 
Stallings (2003b) provides three motivations for the combination of hash functions 
and message authentication codes. These consist of the following: 
 
1. Cryptographic hash functions such as MD5 and SHA-1 execute faster in 
software than block ciphers such as DES. 
2. Documented code is widely available for these peer reviewed hash functions. 
3.  The export restrictions in US that cover block ciphers algorithms when used 
even to compute MACs do not apply to hash functions. 
 
This said, hash functions such as MD5 and SHA-1 were not designed to be used as a 
message authentication codes (MACs) as they do not rely on the use of a secret key.  
The most widely accepted solution to this problem is HMAC as defined in RFC2104 
(Krawczyk, Bellare and  Canetti 1997). HMAC has been chosen as the mandatory-
to-implement MAC for IP security, and is also used in other protocols including SSL 
and SNMP. HMAC employs trusted hashing algorithms which perform well in 
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software such as MD5 and SHA-1. Moreover, HMAC defines a way that the 
underlying hash function (MD5 or SHA-1) can be used unmodified, and provides a 
facility to change the underlying hash function with no manipulation of the HMAC 
algorithm required. HMAC process data in 64 bit blocks and returns a value equal to 
the byte length returned by the underlying hash function. Therefore HMAC would 
return a value of byte length value of 16 (16 bytes) for MD5 and 20 (20 bytes) for 
SHA-1. The keys used in HMAC are generated using a secure method and should 
not be smaller than the byte length returned by the underlying hash function, and 
should not be larger than the block length (64 bits). Keys that are larger than the 
block length (64 bits) are hashed using the underlying hash function. In this case the 
resulting value is used as the key. 
 
As HMAC utilises well tested hash functions, the level of security in HMAC is 
dependent on the level of security offered by the underlying hash function. As 
HMAC employs the services of both hash functions and message authentication 
codes (MACs), HMAC can be used for encryption, authentication and for message 
integrity.  
2.15. Key Generation and Exchange 
The aforementioned sections have focused on the use of a shared key. However, as 
yet there has been no method outlined to provide a secure method for this key to be 
exchanged between two entities communicating across a public channel.  
2.15.1. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm was the first method for secure key 
exchange between two entities communicating across a public channel. This method 
was developed by the visionary cryptographers Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman 
(Schneier and  Ferguson 2003). This method utilises the services of public-key 
cryptography in that like other public-key architectures, it requires each entity to 
generate a public and secret key pair and make their public-key freely available. 
However, unlike traditional public-key methods these keys are not used for 
encryption and decryption, they are used to create a single shared secret between 
entities. 
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The Diffie-Hellman protocol is the combination of one entities secret key with the 
public key of the communicating entity in order to create a shared secret. This 
process begins with the two communicating entities agreeing on a large prime 
number n and g such that g is primitive mod n. These numbers do not need to be 
secret, and therefore can be agreed to over an unsecured channel (Schneier 1996). 
Next, both entities choose a random large integer and send this to the 
communicating entity. The calculation on these shared numbers provides a way to 
combine one entities shared key with the public key of a communicating entity to 
create in essence a shared symmetric key. 
2.16. Cryptography on Mobile Devices 
Implementing cryptographic algorithms on constrained mobile devices is a grate 
challenge. This is due to mobile devices having dramatically less processing power, 
memory, and storage than even the most basic desktop machine. This is why the 
protocols which have been developed to secure personal computers and networks 
can not be directly applied to the mobile platform. This section will provide an 
insight into the existing research into the notion of mobile device cryptography, and 
will focus on the methodologies for key generation and exchange. 
 
Jakobsson and Pointcheval (2002 ) define a method for mutual authentication for 
low-power mobile devices. This research details a study of protocols for mutual 
authentication and key exchange aimed for mobile devices based on the public-key 
exchange protocol defined by Diffie-Hellman as outlined in section 2.15.1. This 
paper presents a model where computation is kept to a minimum on constrained 
devices. Moreover this paper has concluded that the storage requirement for the 
developed protocol is only 70 bytes per process.  
 
Another piece of research in this area was conducted by Chou (2003). This research 
also experimented with public key cryptography and key exchange based on the 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange method. However, this research utilised elliptic curve 
algorithms to provide a public key architecture which executes faster in software 
than traditional public key systems. This is due to elliptical curve cryptography 
providing equal or greater security than traditional standards using a smaller key 
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size, which in turn reduces the processing overhead (Stallings 2003b). Therefore 
elliptic curve operations execute quickly in software. 
2.17. Biometrics 
Authenticating a user by using something specific to the user themselves forms the 
basis of the field of biometrics. Schneier (2004) defines biometrics as “something 
the person has that’s a physical part of their body”. Biometric authentication is a 
familiar concept, as, for example, we all recognise friends and family by their 
distinguishing physical attributes or through the sound of their voice. Biometrics has 
the distinct advantage over other traditional authentication methods, as a biometric is 
not susceptible to ‘forgetting’ by a user, in contrast to the use of passwords. 
Biometrics disciplines include a multitude of fields including: 
• Face Recognition 
• Finger Print Recognition 
• Hand Geometry 
• DNA 
• Iris Scanning 
• Signature Geometry 
• Retina Scanning 
 
The disciplines mentioned above contain both obtrusive and unobtrusive methods of 
authentication. Obtrusive methods require the user to take the effort to make their 
biometric available for use by the system. Conversely, unobtrusive biometrics can 
operate in the background and are therefore transparent to the user. Therefore, face 
recognition has the potential to be one of the most unobtrusive and transparent 
methods for biometric authentication.  
2.17.1. Face Recognition 
Tolba et al. (2005, p. 1) defines face recognition as “a biometric approach that 
employs automated methods to verify or recognise the identity of a living person 
based on their physiological characteristics.” Face recognition has the advantage 
over other biometrics as it is a passive, unobtrusive and transparent way to verify 
identity in a natural manner. Face recognition systems consist of three major steps. 
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Firstly a sensor takes an observation of the subject. Next the observation is 
normalised into a signature by a given algorithm. Finally, this normalised signature 
is compared against a database of stored signatures and is given a similarity score, 
although this similarity score is implementation dependent. 
2.17.2. Eigenfaces 
There are many approaches to face recognition, all which employ different 
techniques. One of the most popular and widely used approaches is the eigenfaces 
technique. Eigenfaces uses principal component analysis to represent pictures of 
faces. This approach approximates facial geometry by calculating a number of 
weights for each face which are obtained by projecting the face image onto a 
standard face picture known as the eigenpicture. The eigenfaces method first 
normalises the images provided for training. This normalisation process locates 
facial features including the eyes, nose and mouth. Next the normalised images are 
processed into eigenvectors which are simply a two-dimensional array of weights 
calculated by mapping the normalised image onto the eigenpicture. 
2.17.3. Biometrics for Transparent Identification 
Ailisto et al. (2004) proposed a system where multimodal light biometrics were used 
to provide unobtrusive user identification. This system looked at using a subject’s 
height, weight and body fat percentage as an identification mechanism. It was 
concluded that using a single light biometrics was not sufficient to provide an 
accurate enough system. Therefore, in a test group of 62 subjects an 11 percent error 
rate was achieved when height was the only modality measured. However this rate 
was decreased to just 2.4 percent when coupled with height data. The authors’ state 
that this method of unobtrusive user identification would only be applicable in a 
non-secure environment, as data used for identification in this process could be 
easily forged.         
2.18. Network Security 
In order for a telematics system to be secure it must be able to successfully 
authenticate both users and network devices. Networks by default are inherently 
insecure. With the advent of malicious users, modern networks must employ certain 
security measures in order to guarantee the confidentiality, integrity and availability 
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of services and user data. The measures used to secure networks are based on 
circumventing the following threats and attacks. 
2.18.1. Confidentiality Threats 
Confidentiality threats are concerned with stopping unauthorised access to sensitive 
data. 
Exposure 
Exposure is a threat to the confidentiality of data in that any message which is 
intercepted wheather at its source, destination or at any intermediate node in the 
network can lead to the exposure of sensitive information. 
Traffic Flow Analysis 
Sometimes not only is the message itself sensitive, but the fact that the message 
exists can also be sensitive.  
2.18.2. Integrity Threats 
Integrity threats are concerned with making sure that every piece of data remain 
consistent with the manner in which it was sent by the source, and has not been 
modified in any way. 
Falsification of Messages 
If traffic arrives at a destination addressed from a trusted source the user will more 
than likely assume that the communication was sent from the trusted party and that it 
has not been unaltered. It is this level of implicit trust that attackers can take 
advantage of. Pfleeger (2003) has outlined the following threats which an attacker 
could employ to falsify the integrity of information. An attacker may: 
• Change some/all of the content of a message; 
• Replace a message entirely, including the date, time and sender/receiver 
information; 
• Reuse (replay) an old message; 
• Combine pieces of different messages into one; 
• Change the apparent source of a message; 
• Redirect a message; 
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• Destroy or delete a message; 
2.18.3. Availability Threats 
Availability threats are concerned with the availability of data and services upon 
demand by an authorised user  
Denial of Service 
If an attacker can block selected or all traffic to a destination or from a source then 
this can result in a lack of availability. 
 
The aforementioned threats outline the multitude of ways that attackers can gain 
access to confidential information, modify data and masquerade as a trusted source. 
For these reasons when administering a network remotely the administrator must be 
assured that they are issuing commands in a secure impenetrable environment. 
Therefore the network administrator must employ the services of a network 
management tool. 
2.19. SNMP 
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is the most widely used network 
management tool for TCP/IP based networks. By definition SNMP is designed to be 
‘simple’ and is therefore easy to implement and requires little computational 
processing and very few network resources. SNMP is designed to operate at the 
application level of the TCP/IP suite, and operates over the user datagram protocol 
(UDP). 
2.19.1. SNMP History 
SNMP was originally specified in 1988. The original version of this specification, 
referred to as SNMPv1 contained security deficiencies including a lack of 
authentication and privacy mechanisms. This version was soon upgraded to 
SNMPv2, which included a security facility. This security facility utilized an 
insecure password-based A further revision of this specification, SNMPv3 was 
incorporated. SNMPv3 is not a replacement for SNMPv1 or SNMPv2, but is rather 
an extension to the predefined framework. SNMPv3 contains a security capability 
which is to be used along side SNMPv2 or SNMPv1. The aforementioned security 
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capability of SNMPv3 provides a facility for network devices to communicate 
securely, thus providing a rigid platform for distributed network management. 
2.19.2. Network Management Systems 
Network management systems are comprised of two types of systems, agents and 
managers. Any device in the network which is to be managed must include an agent 
module. The agent module collects and maintains information regarding its local 
environment and provides this information to a manager when needed, as well as 
responding to manager commands and altering local configurations accordingly. A 
network management system will also contain one or more management stations. 
These management stations include a user interface to provide a facility to observe 
network status, and for issuing commands to agents. Each agent maintains its own 
management information base (MIB). The MIB contains past and present 
information regarding the local configuration and traffic information. The 
management station, in contrast, contains a global MIB which consists of summary 
data from all agents. For a stand-alone management station a manager process is 
used to control access to the global MIB at the management station. This manager 
process achieves network management by using SNMP which is implemented on 
top of UDP, IP and the utilized network protocol (Stallings 2003a, p. 253). 
 
Stallings (2003a) suggests that SNMP is considered to be ‘simple’ because its 
limited to provide only four functions. 
• Get: Used by a manager to query an agent’s MIB and retrieve an item. 
• Set: Used by a manager to set a value in an agents MIB. 
• Trap: Used by an agent to send an alert to a manager. 
• Inform: Used by a manager to send an alert message to another manager. 
2.19.3. SNMP User Security Model (USM) 
The User Security Model is the facility which provides authentication and privacy 
services for SNMP. The USM is in place to protect the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of data in transit between SNMP entities. The USM does this by 
protecting against unauthorised modification of messages in transit. It also protects 
against masquerade, disclosure, and replay attacks. However, the USM does not 
2. Literature Review 
38 
protect against denial of service attacks or traffic analysis (Blumenthal and  Wijnen 
1999). 
2.19.4. SNMP Key Localization 
It is a requirement of SNMPv3 that any communication between a management 
device and an agent device must include a secret authentication key and a secret 
privacy key, which must be shared between the devices.  
 
To simplify key management for users SNMPv3 utilises an algorithm for using a 
user’s password to generate keys. Because of this there is no need for the network 
management system to store user’s keys, as user keys are generated from that user’s 
password when needed. Also, a single password can be used to generate keys for 
both authentication and encryption.  
 
A localised key is defined as a secret key shared between a management device and 
an agent device. Key localization is concerned with creating keys which are unique 
for all devices. Finally, the localization key must be configured on the agent system 
in ‘some secure fashion’ (Stallings 1998). 
 
SNMPv3 has the advantage over other methods of network security as SNMPv3 
employs the services of symmetric-key cryptography which can be used to 
efficiently generate shared secrets for use in a networked environment. 
2.20. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an introduction into the telematics industry and the 
requirements for developing applications for the vehicle domain. Moreover this 
chapter has provided a broad level of background into the inner workings of 
different and competing security methodologies. 
39 
3 
3. Methodology 
Chapter 2 provided an overview of the telematics industry and the challenges of 
designing systems for the vehicle paradigm. However, as was shown and the 
previous section, these systems have largely focused on advanced human computer 
interaction techniques and other matters at the price of security.   
 
The goal of this thesis is to develop a two-tier security architecture for the emulation 
of telematics systems and mobile device integration. In order for mobile devices to 
be successfully integrated into vehicles, a security architecture is required to make 
sure that only authorised devices can interact with the system.  
 
The proposed solution is based around two situations. The first being an 
organisation with shared vehicles, where all staff are provided with a Bluetooth 
enabled mobile device. User preferences can be stored on the device and uploaded to 
the vehicle when the device is authenticated. This allows each user to store 
preferences including seat and steering wheel position, and even radio station presets 
in their mobile device. The second situation is an emulation of modern telematics 
systems. In this case telematics systems can be emulated by interconnecting 
consumer level devices in a scatter-net architecture, as shown in figure 3.1. The 
proposed solution enables telematics systems to be developed at a lower cost than 
commercial telematics systems. Moreover systems can be designed to specific user 
specifications.  
 
Security is paramount in both of these situations as the mobile phone is the device 
which enables the emulated telematics system to be connected to real-time services, 
and provide access to mobile voice/data services. 
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Figure 3.1. Telematics emulation using consumer level devices 
 
Figure 3.1 above illustrates a topological diagram of a typical emulated telematics 
system using consumer level devices. This emulated system conforms to the 
traditional design requirements of a telematics system as outline in Section 2.2. In 
this system the laptop is the main device and is also the device which interfaces with 
the vehicles onboard peripherals via a telematics control unit as outlined in Section 
2.8.2. This topology also contains a global positioning system (GPS) to enable 
location-based and tracking services for the vehicle. This system also conforms to 
the human-computer interaction requirement of speech based interaction for the 
vehicle paradigm as discussed in Section 2.7 by means of the connected microphone 
for input and utilising the sound system for output. Moreover, this system consists of 
both Bluetooth and 802.11 wireless LAN mediums for interconnection with other 
devices in the system. This system can also employ the services of mobile voice/data 
networks such as GSM/GPRS or CDMA/EV-DO via the mobile phone that acts as a 
modem. 
  
The development of a two-tier security architecture for mobile device integration 
requires three main steps. First, a device authentication mechanism must be 
developed. Second, this mechanism must be developed into a protocol in order for it 
to function in a networked environment. Third, a method of user authentication or 
user verification must be developed to define the user’s authority to use the 
authenticated device. 
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3.1. Device Authentication 
In a shared vehicle organisation where user preferences are stored on each user’s 
mobile device, it is paramount that the user authenticates their device before they are 
allowed to access user specific services in the vehicle. This need is enhanced if 
personal preferences are stored on the device such as passwords or email 
authentication details. The need for device authentication in an emulated telematics 
environment is largely an issue of financial cost. In the emulated telematics topology 
depicted in Figure 3.1 the mobile phone is the device which enables the system to be 
connected to wireless off-board services via access to voice/data networks. 
Currently, in most cases the cost of connection to these services is high. Therefore a 
user must be sure that only they are utilising this service, where and when they allow 
it. 
3.1.1. Choice of Base Security Architecture 
The security architecture developed in this thesis must be provably secure, which 
can be achieved by using trusted algorithms and methodologies. Moreover the 
developed architecture must be scalable and perform favourably in a networked 
environment. Finally it must provide a facility for the sharing of secrets between 
known devices in the network. As discussed in Section 2.13.4 there are two general 
methods for sharing a secret between two entities, public-key and symmetric-key 
cryptography.  
 
In the case of this thesis the adopted methodology is required to execute on mobile 
devices of differing specifications. Moreover, all devices in the network are known. 
Therefore the level of security offered by the Diffie-Hellman is not needed as 
symmetric-key methods are suitable for use in this architecture. Moreover Ciampa 
(2005, p. 159) states that as the popularity of mobile devices increases, so to grows 
the need for security on these devices as to provide a facility to protect the device 
from a range of ever increasing attacks. Ciampa also states that these mobile devices 
are also easy targets for theft or loss because of their small size. This last point is on 
of the defining factors in the justification of the base chosen methodology. Public-
key cryptography is used to generate and exchange secret keys across an unsecured 
channel. However, in most cases these keys are stored locally on the device. 
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Therefore if the device were lost or stolen the security of the entire system has been 
compromised. A solution to this is to generate a dynamic key for communication 
with each device in the network from a user known secret. As this key is 
dynamically generated it is not stored on the local mobile device. Therefore if a 
device were to be lost or stolen the system would not be compromised, as the 
attacker would not know the secret used to dynamically generate the key. 
 
As such, the authentication mechanism developed in the current thesis for device 
authentication is based heavily on the SNMPv3 user security model (USM). 
3.1.2. SNMPv3 USM 
As outlined in Section 2.19 SNMP is a set of protocols for the management of 
network devices. This section concentrates on the user security model defined for 
SNMPv3 in RFC2754 (Blumenthal and  Wijnen 1999). As defined in RFC2754 the 
major goals of the SNMP Security Model are to: 
 
1. Provide verification of the integrity of each received message through the 
network; 
2. Provide verification of the identity of the user on whose behalf an SNMP 
message has been generated; 
3. Provide a method of detection for SNMP messages whose time generation is 
not recent. 
 
The first goal of the SNMP Security Model is based around the SNMPv3 USM 
password-to-key algorithm. This algorithm enables a user to dynamically generate 
shared secret keys for each SNMP-enabled device in the network with only having 
to remember a single password. In the password-to-key algorithm, the user enters a 
password, which is appended to the end of the original password string until the 
string is 1 MB in length. The justification behind padding user passwords to 1MB is 
to drastically increase the time and computing power needed to perform an attack on 
the password. This padded (1 MB) string is passed through a secure hash function to 
produce an authKey. Next the authKey is localised using the key localisation 
algorithm. This algorithm takes the unique ID of the remote device (snmpEngineID) 
and encapsulates this string with the user’s dynamically generated authKey. This 
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process is then fed through a secure hash function to produce a localised key, which 
is a shared secret between the user (who can generate the authKey) and the remote 
device, as the new key is localised with its unique ID. 
3.2. Experiment 1: SNMPv3 Password to Key Algorithm 
The first step in the design of a two-tier security architecture consists of an 
investigation into the ability of mobile devices with limited memory and processing 
power to use a modified version of the SNMPv3 password-to-key algorithm for 
dynamic key generation. This experiment tested the size that the user’s password 
can be realistically padded to on mobile phones of differing specifications. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. SNMPv3 Password to Key and Key Localisation Algorithms 
 
Figure 3.2 outlines the steps taken in the first experiment. Firstly the user’s 
password is padded to n number of 64bit blocks. Each 64bit block is fed into either 
3. Methodology 
44 
MD5 or SHA-1 HMAC secure hash algorithm. If the selected algorithm is HMAC-
SHA then the 20octet (160bit) authKey is truncated to 16octets (128bits) as allowed 
by RFC2104 (Krawczyk, Bellare and  Canetti 1997). However, if HMAC-MD5 was 
chosen then the authKey is already 16octets (128bits) in length. This concludes the 
SNMPv3 password-to-key algorithm.  
 
The next step is to localise the key with a specific snmpEngine. This is achieved by 
retrieving the unique identifier for the snmpEngine (snmpEngineID) and 
encapsulating this with the generated authKey. If the snmpEngineID is less than 
32bits in length then it is padded to 32bits. The encapsulated string is now of 64bits 
which is the HMAC block size used. Therefore the encapsulated string is fed into 
the original secure hash algorithm, and either a 20octet (160bit) or a 16octet (128bit) 
string is returned. Finally, the output localised key is truncated to 12octets (96bits) 
as allowed by RFC2104 (Krawczyk, Bellare and  Canetti 1997).  
3.3. Experiment 2: Mobile SNMPv3 USM over Bluetooth 
This experiment extended the first experiment in order to test the viability of a 
mobile SNMPv3 implementation on mobile devices using Bluetooth as the 
networking medium. As the targeted mobile device is a mobile phone, power 
consumption becomes an issue when using the device to transmit data utilising a 
networking medium. However, as outlined in Section 2.10.1 Bluetooth is a wireless 
networking medium designed as a low powered cable replacement technology.  
 
The first task in experiment 2 was to extend experiment 1 to create a slim-lined 
SNMPv3 protocol for use in a mobile environment on restricted devices, which 
satisfied the goals of the SNMPv3 USM as outlined in Section 3.1.2. In this case the 
device is the entity to be authenticated. Therefore the device itself requires a unique 
identifier in order for it to be tracked in the system. As the devices used in this thesis 
are GSM mobile phones a unique identifier is readily available – the International 
Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI)..  
3.3.1. IMEI 
The International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI) is a unique 15 digit number 
configured at the time of manufacture in all GSM mobile devices. The IMEI 
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operates on the same principal as Media Access Control (MAC) addresses assigned 
to network interface cards which are installed in every desktop, laptop and server in 
the world. The 15 IMEI is split into sections including 2 digits which represent the 
vendor, so that each vendor can track allocated and available IMEI numbers. 
  
 
Figure 3.3. SNMPv3 Authentication Protocol 
 
Figure 3.3 details the SNMPv3 Authentication Protocol used in experiment 2. This 
protocol extends experiment 1 by adding services to satisfy the timeliness 
requirement of SNMPv3 USM in order to circumvent replay attacks. In this case the 
client SNMP engine is required to keep track of the servers current time. This is 
simply achieved by selecting a discovered Bluetooth server device, asking the server 
the current time, then storing this timestamp and the time since this value was polled 
in the client device. When the protocol is transmitted the time since polling is added 
to the original server time and inserted into the protocol as the ‘timestamp’. If the 
transmission arrives at the server with in a specified time window the timeliness 
requirement is satisfied. If the transmission arrives at the server with a time value 
outside this preset window the transmission is dropped. RFC2574 defines a 
timeliness window of 150 seconds (Blumenthal and Wijnen 1999). However this 
value is defined in a situation where transmission occurs across a potentially 
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convoluted public TCP/IP based network. The investigation of an appropriate 
timeliness window was the primary goal of experiment 2.  
 
The protocol listed in Figure 3.3 dynamically generated the authKey as outlined in 
experiment 1. This key is localised with the snmpEngineID of the selected server. 
Next the timestamp and other data in the protocol data unit (PDU) is hashed using 
the localised key. The output of this function is a HMAC of either 16 or 20octets 
depending on the algorithm used, and is then truncated to 12octets as allowed by 
RFC2104 (Krawczyk, Bellare and  Canetti 1997). 
 
The final step is to construct the protocol string in the correct format for 
transmission. In this case the leading bit is used to represent the algorithm used (0 
for HMAC-MD5, 1 for HMAC-SHA). The next 15 bits contain the deviceID which 
is simply the unique IMEI of the mobile device. Next the 12octet hashed protocol 
data unit (PDU) is inserted into the protocol string. Finally the original PDU is 
appended to the end of the protocol string in the same format as was used to create 
the hash. When the protocol string arrives at the server the timestamp is checked to 
evaluate whether the timeliness requirement has been satisfied. If the timeliness 
requirement is not satisfied then the packet is dropped. If it is satisfied, then the 
server segments the protocol string, and attempts to retrieve the localised key for the 
device as defined by the IMEI in the protocol string. If there server does not have a 
record of the deviceID then it will notify the device that it is an unknown. Next the 
server calculates its version of the hashed PDU and compares it to the hash in the 
original protocol string. If the values for both of the hashes are the same then the 
device is authenticated. If the hashes do not match the device is notified that a wrong 
password was entered.  
3.4. Development Platform 
The requirement for this protocol to run on mobile devices requires the use of a 
cross-platform development environment with a small footprint. It is this 
requirement that has lead to the system being implemented predominantly in Java 2 
Micro Edition (J2ME) for the evaluation of both experiment 1 and experiment 2. A 
server environment will also be developed for experiment 2 in Java 2 Standard 
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Edition (J2SE). Moreover, an implementation in J2ME does not constrain the 
protocol to a subset of mobile devices, as J2ME is platform independent this 
implementation is cross-platform. 
3.5. Java 2 Micro Edition 
As J2ME implementations are designed to run on resource constrained mobile 
devices the footprint of the J2ME virtual machine must be kept to a minimum. 
However, there are a broad range of mobile devices on the market today and these 
devices have differing resources. For example most personal digital assistant (PDA) 
based devices can offer a greater range of services including processing power and 
memory, than that of a base level implementation on a limited mobile phone based 
device. It is because of this differing of capabilities that J2ME consists of different 
configurations. 
3.5.1. J2ME Configurations 
Keogh (2003, p. 12) defines two available J2ME configurations. Theses are the 
Connected Limited Device Configuration (CDLC) and the Connected Device 
Configuration (CDC). The CDLC is designed for use on small 16 or 32 bit 
computing devices with limited memory and battery life. The CLDC implements a 
trimmed version of the java virtual machine known as the KJava Virtual Machine or 
(KVM). CLDC is the J2ME configuration used in implementation of this thesis, on 
all three mobile devices.  
 
Conversely CDC is designed for 32 bit devices with a minimum of 2 megabytes of 
memory, and can afford to implement a fully functioning java virtual machine 
Devices that utilise the CDC include everything from home appliances to high level 
smart phones. 
3.5.2. J2ME Profiles 
The use of one of the listed J2ME configuration also constrains the level of 
sophistication that can be programmed into the device. This is defined by the J2ME 
profiles. As mentioned previously, packages that involve high amounts of 
processing are only available to devices which implement the connected device 
configuration. Moreover the profiles available to devices implementing the 
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connected limited device configuration include the Mobile Information Device 
Profile (MIDP) which contains a set of base level classes that provide services for 
storage, user interface and wireless networking. MIDP is the profile utilised by this 
implementation.   
3.6. Mobile Cryptography 
As stated previously the implementation in this thesis uses the J2ME connected 
limited device configuration (CLDC) and utilises the mobile information device 
profile (MIDP). However, as discussed in Section 3.5.2 MIDP provides only a base 
level implementation of required packages. Therefore there is no implemented 
cryptography API in MIDP. 
3.6.1. Bouncy Castle Cryptography API 
A solution to this issue was to incorporate a third-party API. The chosen API was 
the Australian based java cryptography effort known as the Legion of The Bouncy 
Castle. The bouncy castle APIs form a complete java cryptography implementation, 
consisting of cryptographic APIs for J2EE, to a subset of APIs with a small footprint 
for use in J2ME (The Legion of The Bouncy Castle). Moreover, a high percentage 
of the cryptographic algorithms implemented are java ports from well known and 
trusted sources such as Schneier’s Applied Cryptography (1996). 
3.7. Bluetooth with J2ME 
To compliment the lack of cryptographic APIs in J2ME, there is also a lack of base 
level support for Bluetooth. In order for java applications to access Bluetooth 
hardware on mobile devices these devices must implement the JSR-82 set of APIs 
for Bluetooth (Sun Microsystems 2002).  
3.7.1. Third-Party Bluetooth APIs 
The JSR-82 APIs provide functionality that can be used to manipulate the Bluetooth 
hardware on mobile devices. However, in this thesis third-party Bluetooth APIs 
were used to speed up the development lifecycle. The Bluetooth APIs used in this 
thesis were the BenHui (Hui) and Java Bluetooth (JavaBluetooth.org) APIs. 
The Java Bluetooth stack was used in conjunction with the BenHui API to extend 
the client/server application that featured as an example in the BenHui APIs. This 
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example implementation was released under a general public license (GPL), and is 
therefore free from restriction as defined in GNU.org (1991).  
3.8. Experiment 3: Evaluation of the Ang System 
The third and final experiment undertaken by this thesis was to evaluate the face 
recognition system developed by Ang (2005) for use as either a user authentication, 
or user tracking system for the vehicle environment. The aim of the Ang system was 
to develop an identification mechanism using face recognition for a wireless 
network in order to provide user specific network services to identified users. The 
Ang system extended a free eigenfaces based (see Section 2.17.2) implementation of 
a ‘quick and dirty’ face recognition algorithm obtained from Sluggish Software 
(Sluggish Software). This system was then modified to operate in real time, with 
input from a complementary metal semiconductor sensor (CMOS) web camera.  
 
The sets of images used for testing the Ang system were obtained by capturing 
images of enrolled users sitting in front of the camera and acting ‘naturally’.  Each 
set of ten images used different environmental variables, such as different 
backgrounds and differing head poses. However, both the camera and the chair 
which the enrolled users sat were both fixed at a distance of 70 centimeters apart. 
Ang conducted two major tests. In the first test users were asked to center their face 
in the capture view and change facial expression with out changing the orientation 
of their head, this test will be referred to as ang_test1. The second test allowed users 
to move their entire head around in the capture window, and will be referred to as 
ang_test2. Ang also tested the effect that different image types had on the accuracy 
of the system and concluded that colour images performed better than black and 
white images. The following section outlines the results obtained by testing the 
system using small (80 × 80) colour images.  
3.8.1. Ang’s Findings 
The Ang system was tested with a total of 10 users enrolled in the system. The first 
experiment tested images enrolled and tested on a black background. The results as 
shown in Table 3.1 bellow are favorable, with a high accuracy rate.  
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Table 3.1. Face Recognition accuracy on black background (Ang 2005) 
5 enrolled images ang_test1 100%
5 enrolled images ang_test2 90%
10 enrolled images ang_test2 100%
Black Background
 
 
The second test was conducted using enrolled images captured on a white 
background, where testing was also conducted on a white background. This test was 
conducted to determine if backgrounds of different brightness would affect the 
accuracy of the system.  
Table 3.2. Face Recognition accuracy on white background (Ang 2005) 
5 enrolled images ang_test1 98%
5 enrolled images ang_test2 94%
10 enrolled images ang_test2 100%
White Background
 
 
The results as outlined in Table 3.2 again present positive results as to the accuracy 
of the Ang system. A final test is to examine the effect of differing backgrounds on 
the level of accuracy of the system. The following table outlines the findings of a 
test where the enrolled images include a white background. Conversely the testing 
images have differing backgrounds. 
Table 3.3. Face Recognition accuracy on different backgrounds (Ang 2005) 
5 enrolled images ang_test1 46%
5 enrolled images ang_test2 56%
10 enrolled images ang_test2 42%
Differing Background
 
 
The findings outlined in Table 3.3 present results which are on average less than 50 
percent accurate. Therefore it can be safely concluded that this system performs 
poorly when tested with images which consist of a greatly different background to 
that of the enrolled images. However the Ang system performed favorably when the 
images used for testing had the same background as the enrolled images. Moreover, 
both Table 3.1 and 3.2 present an accuracy of 100 percent when 10 images are 
enrolled as apposed to a 90 and 94 percent accuracy respectively for the same test 
with only 5 images enrolled.  
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3.8.2. In-vehicle Face Recognition 
The aim of this experiment is to evaluate the Ang face recognition system as a 
method for user authentication, and or user tracking. The requirement for user 
authentication in a vehicle environment is to be used in parallel with the mobile 
SNMPv3 protocol outlined in Section 3.3 for mobile device authentication. This 
addition of this system would employ an added level of security, as the system could 
verify a user’s identity and based on this identity, the users allowance to use an 
authenticated device. Moreover the addition of this system could act as a user 
tracking system which could be used for session monitoring, as in any security 
architecture a successful method to log a user off the system, is as integral to system 
security as a trusted authentication method. In this situation the system would 
routinely monitor the vehicle environment for authenticated users.  
 
In order to emulate the conditions of the vehicle environment the CMOS camera 
was mounted at a position slightly above the user’s eye line as to emulate mounting 
on a vehicle sun visor. Moreover, during the process of user enrolment users were 
required to vary their distance to the camera, including both head distance and chair 
distance. This was done to emulate the varying seat position in the vehicle. The 
background in both the testing and enrollment images was consistent yet not a flat 
contrasting shade as was used during testing the Ang system, as to emulate the 
standard yet inconsistent background of the vehicle environment due to ever 
changing lighting conditions. The non-standardised background should not be an 
issue when evaluating the Ang system, as in Section 3.8.1 it was concluded that 
testing images which had the same background as the enrollment images returned 
positive results. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the Ang system with 1 to 10 enrolled users all of 
which have 10 enrolled images. The first test enrolled users who were the least alike 
in appearance and cultural background as to evaluate the performance of the system 
in a best case scenario. The second test will perform the inverse of the first test in 
that enrolled users will be enrolled which are similar in appearance, this test will 
evaluate the performance of the system in a worst case scenario. 
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4. Discussion and Results 
The following chapter examines the results which were attained in implementing 
both experiments one and two as outlined in chapter 3 on three mobile devices all 
with significantly different specifications.  
4.1. Mobile Phones Used for Testing 
The mobile phones used to test both experiment one and two, are vastly different in 
their specification, including memory and processing power, and level of java 
support. Moreover, two of the three devices are Bluetooth enabled however only the 
Nokia 6600 implements the JSR-82 Bluetooth for Java API, and is therefore the only 
device where any java based Bluetooth experiments can be tested. All three devices 
connect to the GSM mobile voice based network and connect to GPRS mobile 
network for data services. 
4.1.1. Nokia 6610 
Released in the fourth quarter of 2002 the Nokia 6610 was a revolutionary device 
upon release. This device was one of the first in its class to feature a bright colour 
screen, java support and other advanced capabilities.  
 
The Nokia 6610 is the base level device that was used in testing. The base level java 
support in this device allows this device to form the ‘worst case’ scenario from a 
runtime perspective.   
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Specifications 
Operating System: Nokia Series 40 OS 
Memory: 725 kB 
Network: Tri-band GSM (900/1800/1900) 
Data Connectivity: GPRS 
Bluetooth: No 
Screen Resolution: 128×96 
Java Support: 
- Profiles: MIDP-1.0 
- Configuration: CLDC-1.0 
- Bluetooth (JSR-82): No 
- Virtual Processor Speed: 1.2 MHz 
- Max Jar Size: 64 kB 
Figure 4.1. Nokia 6610 
4.1.2. Nokia 6600 
The Nokia 6600 is the mid-level device. However it is used exclusively in testing 
experiment 2 as it is the only phone out of the test devices which includes the java 
Bluetooth API. 
Specifications 
Operating System: Symbian Series 60 OS 7.0s 
Memory: 6 MB 
Network: Tri-band GSM (900/1800/1900) 
Data Connectivity: GPRS 
Bluetooth: Yes 
Screen Resolution: 176×144 
Java Support: 
- Profiles: MIDP-2.0 
- Configuration: CLDC-1.0 
- Bluetooth (JSR-82): Yes 
- Max Jar Size: Dynamic 
Figure 4.2. Nokia 6600 
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4.1.3. iMate SP3i 
The iMate SP3i is the most advanced device tested. This device is the realisation of 
a convergence as it contains a full featured mobile phone, coupled with an advanced 
Microsoft based PDA. 
Specifications 
Operating System: Microsoft Pocket PC 2003 SE OS 
Memory: 32 MB 
Processor: TI OMAP 730 processor 
Network: Tri-band GSM (900/1800/1900) 
Data Connectivity: GPRS (Class 10 (4+1/3+2 slots)) 
Bluetooth: Yes 
Screen Resolution: 176×220 
Java Support: 
- Profiles: MIDP-1.0/2.0 
- Configuration: CLDC-1.0 
- Bluetooth (JSR-82): No 
 
Figure 4.3. iMate SP3i 
4.2. Experiment 1: SNMPv3 Password to Key Results 
The aim of this experiment as outlined in Section 3.2, was to investigated the size 
that an input password could be effectively padded to in accordance with the 
SNMPv3 User Security Model (Blumenthal and  Wijnen 1999). The password-to-
key algorithm was tested with a fixed password and snmpEngindID for key 
localization. This enabled the results to be compared as all devices were undertaking 
the same tasks. The runtimes were gathered and graphed for each device calculating 
to the same block sizes using both HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-SHA-96 algorithms 
over a nominated range of block sizes, up to a maximum of 1 MB as defined in the 
SNMPv3 USM specification (Blumenthal and  Wijnen 1999). 
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4.2.1. Results for HMAC-MD5-96 
Figure 4.4 outlines the runtime of the average of 5 trials executed on all three 
devices using the HMAC-MD5-96 algorithm to pad to n blocks of 64bits.  
 
Figure 4.4. Average runtime of the HMAC-MD5-96 algorithm 
 
From the figure above, it is interesting to note the variance in runtimes between the 
devices, namely the Nokia 6610. A possible cause for such a varied result of a 
runtime of 7:06 minutes to pad the password to 1MB on the Nokia 6610, as 
compared to runtimes of 1:41 minutes and 17.29 seconds to pad the password to 
1MB for the Nokia 6600 and iMate SP3i respectively, is the shear lack of available 
memory on the Nokia 6610. Moreover, Figure 4.4 highlights that a block size of 
1280 blocks (10 kB) is the maximum a password can be efficiently padded using the 
HMAC-MD5-96 algorithm on all three devices, before the runtime increases to an 
impractical level. 
4.2.2. Results for HMAC-SHA-96 
Figure 4.5. illustrates the average runtime after 5 trials of the HMAC-SHA-96 
algorithm padded to n blocks of 64bits on the three mobile devices used for testing. 
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 Figure 4.5. Average runtime for the HMAC-SHA-96 algorithm 
 
The above figure illustrates the average runtimes of the HMAC-SHA-96 algorithm 
as tested on all three mobile devices. These results are consistent with those 
discovered in section 4.2.1. However, in these results the difference is emphasised. 
The variance in runtimes between the Nokia 6610 and the other devices proves the 
authors assertion that the devices performance is restricted due to an insufficient 
availability of memory. Figure 4.5 highlights a runtime of 15:53 minutes for the 
Nokia 6610 to pad the password to 1MB. This is drastically contrasted by the Nokia 
6600 and the iMate SP3i which took 1:40 minutes and 26.24 seconds respectively. It 
is interesting to note the level of increase in runtime between the two algorithms 
implemented. In this case the runtime of the Nokia 6610 increased by over 100 
percent, where the difference in runtime between the other devices was minimal at 
best. However, the results illustrated in Figure 4.5 mirror that of Section 4.2.1, in 
that the maximum size a password can be efficiently padded to using the HMAC-
SHA-96 algorithm is 1280 blocks (10 kB).    
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4.2.3. HMAC-MD5-96 versus HMAC-SHA-96 
Figure 4.6 and the accompanying Table 4.1 bellow provide a comparison of the 
runtimes of both the HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-SHA-96 algorithms on the three 
testing devices. The table and accompanying figure below highlight the difference in 
runtime between the devices for both algorithms.  
Table 4.1. Runtime Comparison between HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-SHA-96 
Device and 
Algorithm 1 10 100 128 1280 12800 25600 51200 102400 131072
iMate SP3i MD5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.8 3.4 6.7 13.5 17.3
Nokia 6600 MD5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.4 10.1 20.1 39.9 79.2 101.6
Nokia 6610 MD5 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.6 4.3 41.8 83.4 166.8 333.8 426.1
iMate SP3i SHA 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 2.7 5.3 10.3 20.7 26.2
Nokia 6600 SHA 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.3 9.8 19.4 39.3 78.3 100.6
Nokia 6610 SHA 0.2 0.3 0.9 1.1 9.5 93.5 186.5 372.3 743.0 953.2
Number of (64bit) Blocks
<-------------------------------------------Runtime in Seconds---------------------------------------->
 
Figure 4.6. Runtime Comparison of HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-SHA-96 
 
The above table and figure clarify the difference in efficiency between the devices. 
In this case we can see a marginal increase in the runtime cost of HMAC-SHA-96 
over HMAC-MD5-96 in both the Nokia 6600 and the iMate SP3i. These results 
emphasise the discrepancy in runtimes between the two algorithms on the Nokia 
6610. 
 
4. Discussion and Results 
58 
Figure 4.6 also strengthens the assumption that the maximum block size that a user’s 
password can be efficiently padded to on all devices is 1280 blocks (10 kB). Table 
4.1 shows an average runtime on the Nokia 6600 and iMate SP3i of less than 1.5 
seconds for password-to-key and key localization.  
4.3. Experiment 2: Bluetooth Mobile SNMPv3 USM Results 
As outlined in Section 3.3 the aim of experiment 2 was to extend the operation of 
the algorithm used in experiment 1 in order to develop a complete protocol for 
SNMPv3 based authentication across a Bluetooth network. The goal of this 
experiment was to discover the size of the time window necessary to implement the 
timeliness requirement of the SNMPv3 user security model over Bluetooth. The 
realisation of this protocol consisted of a Bluetooth client and server application 
developed in J2ME and J2SE.  
 
The timeliness requirement is necessary in order to prevent, or at least decrease the 
protocols susceptibility to message stream modification attacks. These attacks can 
include the unauthorised modification, deletion and replay of legitimate traffic as 
defined in Section 2.18.2.   
 
The client and server application was implemented in both J2ME and J2SE. This 
implementation was based on an example application which accompanied the 
BenHui Bluetooth API as described in Section 3.7.1. As this implementation 
required interfacing with Bluetooth hardware in J2ME the mobile device running the 
application was required to implement the JSR-82 Java Bluetooth. This restriction 
proved a major issue as only one of the testing devices contained a JSR-82 
implementation, this was the Nokia 6600. Therefore the results for experiment 2 we 
obtained solely from testing the software on the Nokia 6600. 
 
• Start the server on the PC to listen for incoming Bluetooth connections 
• Start the client MIDlet on the mobile device (Nokia 6600) 
• Perform Bluetooth device discovery 
• User selects a device (server) to connect to (key localisation) 
• Client asks the server for the current time 
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• Server replies and send the current time to the client 
• Next the user is prompted to entire their password for the selected device 
• Program executes the protocol (See Figure 3.3) 
• Client send the protocol string to the server 
• Server looks at the timestamp 
• If the timestamp is not within the specified window packet is dropped 
• Else the server computes a hash of the PDU and compares it with the one 
sent by the client. 
• If they match the device is authenticated 
Figure 4.7. Experiment 2 program flow 
 
Figure 4.7 above outlines the basic flow of the experiment 2 implementation. As 
stated the aims of this experiment are to determine a suitable time window for the 
developed protocol. 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Execution time for protocol over Bluetooth 
 
Figure 4.8 outlines the total runtime of the entire protocol developed for experiment 
2. However this runtime does not include device discovery. This is due to the fact 
that the process of Bluetooth device discovery is highly varied, and can be 
influenced by such factors as number of devices in range and the distance to these 
devices. Therefore the calculated necessary time window would be heavily 
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dependent on the speed of the device discovery. Due to this fact the time window 
calculation is started as soon as the client selects a Bluetooth device to connect to. 
Figure 4.8 above illustrates an average of 17seconds for the completion of the 
protocol over Bluetooth. Therefore a time window of approximately 30 seconds 
should be sufficient to protect against message stream modification attack. 
4.4. Experiment 3 Results 
 As discussed in Section 3.8, the third experiment was to evaluate the Ang face 
recognition system for use as a user authentication and/or user tracking mechanism 
for the vehicle environment.  
 
The Ang system was tested with different numbers of enrolled users, from 2 users to 
10 users. The number of enrolments was restricted due to the assumption that in a 
shared device environment a single device would not be shared among more than 10 
users.  
 
After 10 users were photographed with the web camera batch testing cases were 
compiled with differing number of enrolled users from 2 to 10. In the first test users 
were added to the system that had the most differing appearance, sex and cultural 
background to that of the test case.  This was done to form an initial best case 
judgment of the success of the system. 
 
Testing was carried out in a way that would emulate the vehicle environment. 
Because of this there was no flat white/black background as in the prior research. 
Moreover, the users were asked during the initial enrolment period to move there 
position to the camera as to emulate the variance of a car seat in differing positions. 
The users were asked at the time of initial enrollment to capture a large number of 
images, which were later restricted to 10 images per user. These 10 images were 
selected based on their orientation and distance from the camera, so as to provide a 
varied, yet consistent set of images per user. 
4.4.1. Test 1: Best Case 
The results from the first test proved rather promising. As shown in the figure 
bellow. 
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Figure 4.7. Results test 1: Best Case 
 
Figure 4.7 illustrates the accuracy of the Ang system in the best case scenario. The 
trend line is projected onto the above figure as it reflects the chance performance of 
the system in that when one user is enrolled, there is a 100 percent chance that this 
user will be selected. Conversely when 10 users are enrolled the system the chance 
performance drops to 10 percent.   
4.4.2. Test 2: Worst Case 
 
Figure 4.8. Results test 2: Worst Case 
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Figure 4.8 outlines the results on testing the Ang system with enrolled user of 
similar facial characteristics. The trend line shows that the system performed worst 
than would be expected from a chance performance. 
  
It was noticed during test 1 of the face recognition that wrong classifications were 
occurring mostly with users whose username was alphabetically before the test case. 
It was this finding that lead to test 3.  
4.4.3. Test 3: Modified Best Case 
Test 3 consisted on the same enrolment methodology as test 1. However the 
username of the test case was changed to “zz”, in order to test the assumption that 
the system was running through the enrolled users in alphabetical order until it 
found a user that was above a hard coded threshold. Test 3 provided the following 
results. 
 
Figure 4.9. Results test 3: Modified Best Case 
 
Figure 4.9 outlines the results obtained for test 3. In this case the system performed 
drastically worse than would be expected from a change performance. 
 
The results for test 3 with the same user set seemed to agree with the previous 
assumptions of the system. Moreover, the system always returns a user as 
authenticated. It either returns the closest or the alphabetically closest to the 
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presented image. Because of this the performance of the system must be able to 
assure that it will identify the correct user. Otherwise its use as an authentication or 
verification of identity mechanism is not sufficient to be applied to a security 
application. 
4.4.4. Deceiving the Face Recognition System 
Further testing of the Ang system discovered that it was easy to deceive the system. 
The first test was to access the ability to deceive the system by using a printed image 
of an enrolled user. The results of this test classified the printed image more 
accurately than it did the real entity. Next the system was tested by holding a picture 
of the back of a persons head to the camera and in this case a user was returned 
although with varied results. The main conclusion that can be made regarding the 
Ang system is that it is not accurate enough for use in a security architecture. 
Moreover, the system always returns a user as identified, even if the entity 
attempting to authenticate them self is not enrolled in the system, it will accept their 
appearance as an enrolled user’s identity. 
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5. Conclusions and Further Work 
The research within this thesis analysed the current situation of the automotive 
telematics industry, including the current design goals for vehicle based systems and 
most importantly the lack of adopted security protocols for the mobile platform.  
 
This thesis proposed and implemented a security protocol for the vehicle paradigm 
based on the simple network management protocol (SNMP) version 3 user security 
model (USM). This protocol is the most widely adopted network management 
protocol for TCP/IP based networks. SNMPv3 was chosen over other security 
protocols as it utilised the services of symmetric-key cryptography, which unlike the 
public-key methods provides a protocol which is efficient to implement in software, 
scalable and that is proven to be secure by employing the services of mathematically 
proven cryptographic algorithms.  
 
This security protocol was developed to provide a method for secure mobile device 
integration for automotive telematics based on two scenarios. The first being a 
shared vehicle origination where all staff are provided with a Bluetooth enabled 
mobile device. The security requirement for this scenario is that user preferences are 
stored on the mobile device and can be uploaded to any of the shared vehicles. The 
preferences stored on these devices can contain seat and steering wheel position, and 
even radio presets. The second scenario defined an example topology for the 
emulation of high level telematics systems using only consumer level devices. This 
emulation requires the use of a telematics control unit (TCU) as defined in Section 
2.8.2. The TCU acts as a gateway between the consumer level devices and the 
onboard devices. Moreover, any vehicle based system should be primarily focused 
on safety. By employing the services of a workload manager as defined in Section 
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2.6.1 the current driving context can be analysed and information can be either 
provided to the driver in a standard or non standard way depending on the inferred 
context. Moreover an advanced method of interaction is required for the vehicle 
environment. This study has shown that voice based interaction is the most suited 
modality for the vehicle paradigm.    
 
This thesis incorporated three major goals. First, an evaluation of the length a user’s 
password could be efficiently mapped to on mobile devices of differing 
specifications, as a mobile implementation of the SNMPv3 USM. It was concluded 
from this study that a pad size of 10kB will provide adequate security, while 
remaining efficient on the three mobile devices used for testing.  
 
Second, the first goal was expanded into a protocol for mobile device integration. 
This protocol was a full implementation of the SNMPv3 USM for device 
authentication using Bluetooth for the transmission between the client and the 
server. The objective of this goal was to evaluate the length of the time window 
required in order to protect the system from message stream modification attacks. It 
was concluded that it was not practical to incorporate Bluetooth device discovery in 
to the time window a the time taken for Bluetooth discovery is dependent on many 
factors including the number of, and distance to other Bluetooth devices in range. 
However, it was concluded that a time window of approximately 30 seconds should 
be sufficient to provide the transmission of slightly delayed legitimate messages, 
where at the same time be short enough for any attack to be rendered harmless.  
 
Third, the Ang face recognition system was evaluated for use in a vehicle 
environment, although with varying results. Initially the results returned were 
favorable, as the first test was the best case scenario. The second test enrolled users 
were in order of their likeness in appearance to users already enrolled in the system. 
This was done to evaluate a possible worst case scenario. The results from this test 
were not as favorable as that of the first. In that the system inaccurately classified 
enrolled users at a rate less than the probable chance of the system. An anomaly was 
found while testing the Ang system. It was discovered that a high percentage of the 
wrong classifications were returning users with a username alphabetically before 
that of the test subject. In order to test this assumption the best case scenario of test 
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one was reevaluated. However in this case the test cases username was changes to 
“zz”. The results for experiment 3 showed a correct classification level drastically 
lower than that of probable chance.  Therefore it was concluded that as an 
authentication or user tracking mechanism this system was not accurate enough to 
be used for this purpose. 
5.1. Further Work 
As it has been shown that a method of secure device integration can be developed 
for use on mobile devices operated in a networked environment, the field of mobile 
security will be an integral industry in the furthering of security in all aspects of 
mobile device integration, from the vehicle, to mobile commerce applications where 
security is paramount.      
 
As it has been shown that the Ang face recognition system is not sufficient to 
provide an adequate level of security to the application of mobile device integration, 
other more secure methods for transparent or limited interaction authentication, 
which may include the use of wireless radiofrequency identification (RFID) tokens. 
Conversely a higher level face recognition system may be the answer.  
 
Moreover, it would be interesting to test the viability of the implemented system 
with transparent authentication. In this case the user would not have to physically 
enter their password prior to performing Bluetooth discovery. Extending this, 
possible methods for user tracking could be developed in order to track users’ 
movements through out the use of the system, and could facilitate a method for 
secure sign off.  
 
Another field of possible extension would be to intercept and study the Bluetooth 
communication between the client and server at time of the transfer of the developed 
protocol. This would be interesting to determine the level of possible added security 
if the Bluetooth communications link was encrypted. 
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7. Appendices  
7.1. Appendix A – Password to Key Raw Data (MD5) 
This appendix contains raw data relating to the testing of the mobile SNMPv3 USM 
as described in Section 3.2. Note all figures represent the runtime in seconds. 
 
  
Nokia 6610 64b 80B 800B 1KB 10KB 100KB 200KB 400KB 800KB 1MB
Num Blocks 1 10 100 128 1280 12800 25600 51200 102400 131072
1st Run 0.17 0.20 0.49 0.57 4.32 41.98 83.49 166.91 334.09 425.46
2nd Run 0.16 0.19 0.50 0.58 4.30 41.65 83.34 166.68 333.12 426.79
3rd Run 0.16 0.19 0.48 0.58 4.36 41.99 83.73 166.69 334.68 426.56
4th Run 0.16 0.19 0.50 0.57 4.31 41.82 83.18 166.79 333.57 426.12
5th Run 0.16 0.19 0.48 0.58 4.30 41.67 83.27 166.97 333.58 425.64
AV 0.16 0.19 0.49 0.58 4.32 41.82 83.40 166.81 333.81 426.12
 
 
Nokia 6600 64b 80B 800B 1KB 10KB 100KB 200KB 400KB 800KB 1MB
Num Blocks 1 10 100 128 1280 12800 25600 51200 102400 131072
1st Run 0.31 0.33 0.44 0.47 1.53 10.38 20.81 40.11 80.22 101.83
2nd Run 0.28 0.28 0.41 0.45 1.44 10.02 19.47 40.16 78.30 101.55
3rd Run 0.27 0.28 0.44 0.48 1.36 9.83 19.89 39.53 80.00 101.44
4th Run 0.31 0.31 0.42 0.44 1.47 10.09 20.31 39.86 78.31 101.94
5th Run 0.28 0.31 0.48 0.45 1.33 10.13 20.14 39.64 79.00 101.16
AV 0.29 0.30 0.44 0.46 1.43 10.09 20.13 39.86 79.17 101.58
 
 
iMate SP3i 64b 80B 800B 1KB 10KB 100KB 200KB 400KB 800KB 1MB
Num Blocks 1 10 100 128 1280 12800 25600 51200 102400 131072
1st Run 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.25 1.77 3.49 6.83 13.46 17.27
2nd Run 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.32 1.77 3.43 6.41 13.49 17.18
3rd Run 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.25 1.76 3.42 6.78 13.49 17.26
4th Run 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.25 1.79 3.45 6.79 13.47 17.25
5th Run 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.25 1.76 3.43 6.69 13.61 17.48
AV 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.26 1.77 3.44 6.70 13.50 17.29
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7.2. Appendix B – Password to Key Raw Data (SHA) 
This appendix contains raw data relating to the testing of the mobile SNMPv3 USM 
as described in Section 3.2. Note all figures represent the runtime in seconds. 
 
 
Nokia 6610 64b 80B 800B 1KB 10KB 100KB 200KB 400KB 800KB 1MB
Nun Blocks 1 10 100 128 1280 12800 25600 51200 102400 131072
1st Run 0.19 0.26 0.91 1.11 9.48 94.02 187.01 373.68 746.44 954.87
2nd Run 0.19 0.26 0.91 1.11 9.46 93.20 186.20 371.71 743.95 952.18
3rd Run 0.19 0.26 0.91 1.11 9.51 93.54 186.45 371.96 746.12 953.66
4th Run 0.19 0.26 0.93 1.12 9.67 93.37 186.00 372.17 744.83 952.82
5th Run 0.19 0.25 0.91 1.13 9.46 93.34 186.92 372.10 743.72 952.26
AV 0.19 0.26 0.91 1.12 9.52 93.49 186.51 372.33 745.01 953.16
 
 
 
 
Nokia 6600 64b 80B 800B 1KB 10KB 100KB 200KB 400KB 800KB 1MB
Nun Blocks 1 10 100 128 1280 12800 25600 51200 102400 131072
1st Run 0.30 0.28 0.45 0.47 1.27 9.89 19.48 40.11 79.55 100.02
2nd Run 0.27 0.30 0.44 0.47 1.28 9.75 19.66 38.94 77.47 100.13
3rd Run 0.25 0.27 0.40 0.47 1.24 9.91 19.31 38.69 78.48 101.31
4th Run 0.27 0.28 0.45 0.45 1.37 10.03 19.28 39.52 78.89 101.03
5th Run 0.25 0.25 0.44 0.47 1.28 9.63 19.44 39.17 77.30 100.64
AV 0.27 0.28 0.44 0.47 1.29 9.84 19.43 39.28 78.34 100.63
 
 
 
 
iMate SP3i 64b 80B 800B 1KB 10KB 100KB 200KB 400KB 800KB 1MB
Num Blocks 1 10 100 128 1280 12800 25600 51200 102400 131072
1st Run 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.36 2.73 5.81 10.29 21.67 25.17
2nd Run 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.36 2.74 5.24 10.24 20.26 25.29
3rd Run 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.38 2.55 5.03 10.23 20.39 27.89
4th Run 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.34 2.78 5.16 10.25 20.41 27.84
5th Run 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.33 2.63 5.50 10.28 20.52 25.03
AV 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.35 2.68 5.35 10.26 20.65 26.24
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7.3. Appendix C – Face Recognition Test 1 Raw Data 
 
 
1 USER 2 USERS 3 USERS 4 USERS 5 USERS 6 USERS 7 USERS 8 USERS 9 USERS 10 USERS
1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
4 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
5 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
6 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y
7 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
8 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N
9 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N
10 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N
11 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y
12 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N
13 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y
14 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
15 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
16 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
17 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
18 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y
19 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y
20 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y
21 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y
22 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y
23 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N
24 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
25 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y
26 Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
27 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
28 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
29 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
30 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
31 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
32 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
33 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
34 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y
35 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
36 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y
37 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y
38 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N
39 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N
40 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N
41 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y
42 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y
43 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
44 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
45 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
46 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
47 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
48 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y
49 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
50 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
WRONG 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 9 7 8
FACE RECOGNITION TEST 1
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7.4. Appendix D – Face Recognition Test 2 Raw Data 
 
1 USER 2 USERS 3 USERS 4 USERS 5 USERS 6 USERS 7 USERS 8 USERS 9 USERS 10 USERS
1 Y N N N N N Y Y Y N
2 Y Y N N N N Y N N Y
3 Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y
4 Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y
5 Y Y N Y N N N Y Y Y
6 Y Y N Y Y N N Y Y Y
7 Y Y N Y Y N N N Y Y
8 Y N Y Y N N Y N Y Y
9 Y N Y Y N N Y N Y Y
10 Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y Y
11 Y N N N N N Y Y N Y
12 Y N N Y N N Y Y Y Y
13 Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y N
14 Y N N N Y N N Y Y N
15 Y N Y N Y N N N Y Y
16 Y N Y Y N N Y N N Y
17 Y N N Y N N N Y N N
18 Y N Y Y N N N Y Y N
19 Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y
20 Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y
21 Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y
22 Y Y Y N N N Y Y N Y
23 Y Y N Y N N N Y N N
24 Y Y N Y Y N N Y N N
25 Y Y N N Y N N Y Y N
26 Y Y N N N N N Y Y N
27 Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y
28 Y Y Y Y N N Y N Y N
29 Y N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y
30 Y N N N Y N N Y Y Y
31 Y N Y N Y N N Y N Y
32 Y N N N N N N N N Y
33 Y Y N N N N Y N N Y
34 Y Y N N Y N N N N Y
35 Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y N
36 Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y N
37 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N
38 Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
39 Y N N Y Y Y N Y N Y
40 Y N N Y Y N N Y N Y
41 Y N N Y Y N N Y N Y
42 Y N N Y Y N N Y N Y
43 Y Y N Y N N Y Y N Y
44 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y
45 Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
46 Y Y N Y N N N Y N Y
47 Y Y N N N N N Y N Y
48 Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y
49 Y Y N N Y N N Y N Y
50 Y N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y
WRONG 0 22 38 21 25 42 30 13 21 13
FACE RECOGNITION TEST 2
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7.5. Appendix E – Face Recognition Test 3 Raw Data 
 
1 USER 2 USERS 3 USERS 4 USERS 5 USERS 6 USERS 7 USERS 8 USERS 9 USERS 10 USERS
1 Y N N N N N N N N N
2 Y N N N N N N N N N
3 Y N N N N N N N N N
4 Y N N N N N N N N N
5 Y N N N N N N N N N
6 Y N N N N N N N N N
7 Y Y N N N N N N N N
8 Y N N N N N N N N N
9 Y N N N N N N N N N
10 Y Y N N N N N N N N
11 Y N N N N N N N N N
12 Y N N Y N N N Y N Y
13 Y N N N N N N N N Y
14 Y N N N N N N N N N
15 Y N N N N N N N N N
16 Y N N N N N N N N N
17 Y N Y N N N N N N N
18 Y N N N N N N N N N
19 Y N N Y N N N N N N
20 Y N N Y N N N N N N
21 Y N N N N N N N N N
22 Y N N N N N N N N N
23 Y N N N N N N N N N
24 Y N N N N N N N N N
25 Y N Y N N N Y N N N
26 Y N N N N N N N N N
27 Y N N N N N N N N N
28 Y N N N N N N N N N
29 Y N N Y N Y N N N N
30 Y N N Y N Y N N N N
31 Y N N Y N N N N N N
32 Y N N N N N N N N N
33 Y N N N N Y N N N N
34 Y N N N N N N N Y N
35 Y N N N N N N N Y N
36 Y N N N N N N N N N
37 Y N N N N N N N Y N
38 Y N N N N N N N N N
39 Y N N N N N N N N N
40 Y N N N N N N N N N
41 Y N N N N N N N N N
42 Y N N N N N N N N N
43 Y N N Y N N N N N N
44 Y N Y N N N N N N N
45 Y N N N N N Y N N N
46 Y N Y N N N N N N N
47 Y N N N N N N N N N
48 Y N N N N N N N N N
49 Y N N N N N N N N N
50 Y N N N N N N N N N
WRONG 0 48 46 43 50 47 48 49 47 48
FACE RECOGNITION TEST 3
 
